May 3, 2026
By Stephen Stofka
This week, while waiting to cross a busy intersection, I noticed the networks that surround us. Traffic light sequences, driving regulations and customs help us navigate our world. Clouds gathered in the afternoon sky, a sign of the water cycle of evaporation, condensation and precipitation, a network of energy. My phone is a node in an information network. My bike is a network of mining and manufacturing. My clothes are a network of agriculture, manufacturing and transportation. Fish swim in water. Human beings swim in networks of words, legal rules and social customs.
As societies, we are the network. Networks operate by rules. In a republic or democracy, the voters determine those governing rules or elect representatives to craft those rules. The voting process itself abides by rules. In the United States, some rules are determined by the states, some by Congressional statute, others by the Constitution. Article 1 of the Constitution gave the states the primary responsibility for administering federal elections but allowed Congress to make laws as well (Source).The Constitution required each state to redraw its congressional districts to adjust for population changes and balance geographic population shifts within the state.
In 1965, under the authority granted by the 14th and 15th Amendments, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act (VRA) to counter decades of discriminatory voting practices in some states (Source). Under Jim Crow laws, the southern states had marginalized black voters for eighty years by requiring black voters to pass tests before they could vote.
Section 2 of the VRA sets the principle: “No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color” (Source). Section 4 of the VRA stipulated that any states or counties that had an election test in place on November 1, 1964, were discriminating against some voters (Source). Section 5 of the VRA subjected the election practices of those violators to a preclearance review by federal authorities. Those violators included seven southern states, Alaska and Arizona. Other states had some districts within their state subject to the same review. The whole state of North Carolina was not subject to review, but many of its counties were. Several counties in New York, Florida, S. Dakota and California were also subject to review (Source).
The law is a vast network of principles and values, history and consequences, all bound together by words. Conservatives have long sought to weaken the voting rights network by attacking key clauses in the VRA. Since his time working in the Justice Department under the Reagan Administration in the 1980s, Chief Justice Roberts has advocated a weakening of Section 2 of the Act. In Chapter 12 of her book Without Precedent, Lisa Graves describes this long history.
In Shelby County v Holder, decided in 2013, the Court ruled that Section 4 of the VRA was unconstitutional because the criteria that determined a violator did not respond to current conditions (Source). In his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts encouraged Congress to update the criteria but the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act was filibustered in the Senate. A key segment of the Act was severed.
In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee (2021) the Court limited the type of practices that could be considered discriminatory under Section 2 of the VRA (Source). Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion. Another key segment cut.
This week, in Louisiana v Callais, a 6-3 majority of the Court voted along ideological lines that any election practice in violation of Section 2 of the VRA must be intentionally racially discriminatory. Another segment of the network cut. The court effectively raised the bar for anyone claiming discrimination because proving intention is a difficult task. A redistricting map that discriminates against Democrats is not racial discrimination if a state legislature can claim that the map meant only to discriminate against Democrats.
Justice Alito, the author of the majority opinion, stated, “When Section 2 of the Act is properly interpreted, it imposes liability only when circumstances give rise to a strong inference that intentional discrimination occurred. Properly understood, Section 2 thus does not intrude on States’ prerogative to draw districts based on nonracial factors, including to achieve partisan advantage” (Source). Alito’s interpretation is based on a textual analysis, or textualism.
Textualism selects and emphasizes words and combinations of words that support a justice’s preferred interpretation. Alito calls his preferred interpretation the “proper” one, as though it were endorsed by a higher power. Textualists claim that their opinion is based on the text, so that makes their opinion objective. However, those opinions are based on some of the text, and what constitutes that some is a matter of the justice’s discretion. Textualism is the art of selecting words that justify a justice’s sentiments. Judicial interpretations based on textualism use a divide and conquer strategy. By dividing the text into separate compartments, they conquer the intentions of the whole of the text.
In the District of Columbia v Heller decision, former Justice Antonin Scalia negated more than a century of precedent and opined that the Second Amendment contained an individual right to bear arms (Source). The founders hotly debated the words in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights because those words were critical to ratification. In drafting the Second Amendment, they inserted the clause about the militia. If only they could have known that Scalia would choose to disregard their efforts, they wouldn’t have bothered. Scalia discarded that half of the text of the Second Amendment having to do with the militia. It was a “prefatory clause,” Scalia wrote, whose meaning was subjunctive to what Scalia thought was the main clause, which agreed with Scalia’s sentiments. Because a textualist approach is inherently arbitrary, the lower courts had difficulty applying Scalia’s reasoning in subsequent cases and began to use a balancing approach traditionally associated with First Amendment cases.
After Scalia died, the court tried to clarify Scalia’s textualist approach in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen (2022). Justice Clarence Thomas wrote the majority opinion urging the lower courts to use history and tradition to understand restraints on government power. Did the Founding generation or the Civil War generation have a similar law? Thomas called this the text, history and tradition approach. Where Scalia had used history to understand the meaning of a section of text, Thomas used history as a guiding boundary of government power. In his dissent, former Justice Stephen Breyer noted that a justice has a wealth of history to pick and choose from to support their opinion. Both the strict textualist and text, history and tradition forms of analysis are ungrounded and arbitrary. This approach looks to the past. It’s the judicial version of walking backward.
On page 111 of his book Reading the Constitution: Why I Chose Pragmatism, Not Textualism, retired Justice Stephen Breyer offered an alternative judicial analysis: text, values and consequences. The text of a statute or the Constitution represents the past. Justices should consider the consequences of their opinion, a respect for the future. What joins past and present are the enduring values embodied in a law.
Breyer often held public debates with Scalia and recalled the irresolvable issues between the two justices. Breyer read the totality of a statute or a constitutional amendment. He saw the law as a network of words, and that network had a purpose, a problem that it wanted to resolve. Scalia, on the other hand, picked out the words in a text that he thought were important. He pretended to be a historian, able to divine the original meaning of the words that 19th century legislators used. According to Breyer, page 25, Scalia thought that his approach would create a “science of statutory interpretation.” Far from it. Since the Heller opinion, there have been several cases in which the court tried to amend, extend and clarify the jurisprudence of Heller.
The specific finding in the Louisiana v Callais case was that Louisiana’s redistricting map was unconstitutional because it was based on racial gerrymandering (Source). In Rucho v. Common Cause (2019), Roberts had written that partisan gerrymandering was political and beyond the reach of federal courts. In Roberts’ view, partisan gerrymandering does not undermine the Court’s precedent of “one man, one vote,” even if that gerrymandering weakens the electoral voice of constitutionally protected black Americans.
In Shelby County and in this case, the Court has not eviscerated the VRA, but wounded key segments of the Act, Sections 2, 4, and 5. More than 80% of black voters choose a Democrat candidate. As the dissent in Louisiana v Callais noted, it will be difficult for any plaintiff to show that a redistricting map discriminated against voters based on their race or color. The respondents can claim that political divisions, not race discrimination, motivated the redistricting schema. What did the network of words in the 15th Amendment and Voting Rights Act try to accomplish? To undo the silencing of a particular minority at the ballot box. The Court has effectively undone that undoing. I hope to see you next week.
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Photo by Krys Amon on Unsplash
Note: When Alito’s opinion refers to section 2(a) or 2(b), he is referring to the text of the U.S. law that encodes the Voting Rights Act as amended. See here (Source).