July 30, 2023
by Stephen Stofka
This week’s letter is a proposal for an alternative measure to guide the Fed’s monetary policy. In 1978, Congress passed the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act which gave the Fed a dual mandate – giving equal importance to price stability and full employment. The Canadian central bank has a hierarchical mandate with price stability as a priority. As with most Congressional mandates, the legislation left it up to the agency, the Fed, to determine what price stability and full employment meant. The Fed eventually settled on a 2% inflation target. Full employment varies between 95-97% and is hinged on inflation.
For its measure of inflation, the Fed relies on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) who conducts monthly surveys of consumer expenditures. The BLS compiles a CPI based on the its price surveys of hundreds of items. The Fed prefers an alternative measure based on the Consumer Expenditure Survey, but the weakness in both measures is the complexity of the methodology and the inherent inaccuracy of important data points.
According to the BLS, housing costs account for more than a third of the CPI calculation. Twenty-five percent of the CPI is based on an estimate of the imputed rental income that homeowners receive from their home. This estimate is based on a homeowner’s response to the following question: “If someone were to rent your home today, how much do you think it would rent for monthly, unfurnished and without utilities?” How many owners pay close attention to the rental prices in their area? The BLS also surveys rental prices but tenants have six to 12 month leases so these rental estimates are lagging data points. The BLS tries to reconcile its survey of rents with homeowners’ estimates of rents using what it admits is a complex adjustment algorithm.
The BLS regards the purchase of a home as an investment, not an expenditure so it must make these convoluted estimates of housing expense. There is a simpler way. Buyers and sellers capitalize income and expense flows into the price of an asset like a house. The annual growth in home prices would be a more reliable and less complex measure of inflation. Federal agencies already publish monthly price indexes based on mortgage data, not homeowner estimates and complex methodology. An all-transactions index includes refinancing as well as purchases. Bank loan officers have a vested interest in monitoring local real estate prices so their knowledge is an input to the calculation of a home’s value when an owner refinances.
The Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) publishes the All-Transactions House Price Index based on the millions of mortgages that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac underwrite. From 1990 – 2020, home prices rose by an average of 3.5% per year. A purchase only index that does not include refinances rose almost 3.9% during that period. As an aside, disposable personal income rose an average of 4.6% during that period.
The Fed does not need authorization from the Congress to adopt an alternative measure of inflation to guide monetary policy. As its strategy for price stability, the Fed could set a benchmark of 4% – 5% home price growth, near the 30 year average. If house prices are rising faster than that benchmark, monetary policy is too accommodating and the Fed should raise rates. Since the onset of the pandemic, home prices have risen 11% per year, three times the 40 year average. This same growth marked the peak of the housing boom in 2005-2006 before the financial crisis. The Fed did not begin raising interest rates until the spring of 2022. Had it used a home price index, it would have reacted sooner.
The annual growth in home prices first rose above 4% in the second quarter of 2013. The Fed kept interest rates at near zero until 2016, helping to fuel a boom in both the stock market and housing market. Since 2013, house prices have stayed above 4% annual growth, helping to fuel a surge in homelessness. Let’s look at several earlier periods when using home prices as a target would have indicated a different policy to monetary policymakers at the Fed.
In 1997, the annual growth of home prices rose above 4% and remained elevated until the beginning of 2007 when the housing boom began to unravel. In 2001, home prices had risen almost 8% in the past four quarters but the Fed began lowering its benchmark Federal Funds rate from 5.5% to just 1% at the start of 2004. The Fed was responding to increasing unemployment and a short recession following the dot-com bust. Near the end of that recession came 9-11. By lowering rates the Fed was pushing asset capital that had left the stock market into the housing market where investors took advantage of the spread between low mortgage rates and high home price growth.
In 2004, home price growth was over 8% and accelerating. Had the Fed been targeting home prices, it would have acted sooner. However, the Fed waited until the general price level began rising above its target of 2%. In the 2004-2006 period, the Fed raised rates by 4%, but it was too late to tame the growing bubble in the housing market. In 2005, home prices grew by 12% but began responding to rising interest rates. By the first quarter of 2007, home price growth had declined to just 3.3%.
The Fed models itself as an independent agency crafting a monetary policy that is less subject to political whims. However, the variance in their policy reactions indicates that the Fed is subject to the same faults as fiscal policy. If the Congress is crippled, then the Fed feels a greater pressure to react and is helping to fuel the boom and bust in asset markets. Let’s turn to the issue of full employment.
The condition of the labor market is guided by two surveys. The employer survey measures the change in employment but does not capture a lot of self-employment. The household survey captures demographic trends in employment and measures the unemployment rate. The BLS makes a number of adjustments to reconcile the two series. The collection of large datasets and the complex adjustments needed to reconcile separate surveys naturally introduces error.
The labor market has experienced large structural changes in the past several decades. Despite that, construction employment remains about 4.5 – 5.5% of all employment so it is a descriptive sample of the condition of the overall market. Declines in construction employment coincide with or precede a rise in the unemployment rate. In the past 70 years, the construction market has averaged 1.5% annual growth. During the historic baby boom years of the 1950s and 1960s, the growth rate averaged 2%. The Fed might set a target window of 1.5% – 2.5% annual growth in construction employment. Anything below that would warrant accommodative monetary policy. Anything above that would indicate monetary tightening. In 1999, the growth rate was 7%, confirming the home price indicator and strongly suggesting that fiscal or monetary policy was promoting an unsustainable housing sector boom.
If the Fed had adopted these targets, what would be its current policy? The FHFA releases their home price data quarterly. The growth in home prices has declined in the past year but was still 8.1% in the first quarter of 2023. However, the S&P National Home Price index tracks the FHFA index closely and it indicates a slight decline in the past 4 quarters. Growth in construction employment has leveled at 2.5%, within the Fed’s hypothetical target range. The combination of these two indicators would signal a pause in interest rate hikes. This week, the Fed continued to compound its policy mistakes and raised interest rates another ¼ percent.
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