December 1, 2024

by Stephen Stofka

This is part of a continuing series of debates on economic and political issues. Substack users can find the past two debates here and here. WordPress and other  users can visit my web site innocentinvestor.com here. Hope everyone had a good Thanksgiving.

This week’s letter focuses on market failures, continuing an ongoing series of debates on economic and political issues. Investopedia describes market failure as “the inefficient allocation of resources that occurs when individuals acting in rational self-interest produce a sub-optimal outcome.” In an idealized market, prices act as signals to consumers and producers, who alter their behavior in response. Those actions affect prices, producing a feedback loop that moves supply and demand toward an equilibrium that maximizes the benefits or minimizes the costs to both consumers and producers (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2017, p. 312).

Market failures occur when that equilibrium-seeking process is prevented. Failures occur in markets where:
1) a company has monopoly power,
2) buyers or sellers have incomplete information,
3) there are externalities where the effects of consumption do not fall entirely on the buyer of the product or service. Pollution is a common example,
4) public goods where a good or service benefits the group as a whole but the dynamics of the market result in an undersupply.

Abel began the conversation, “Last week we left off with the housing market in New York City being a prime example of a market failure.”

Cain replied, “That’s right. I said that behind every market failure is a policy failure. The idealized ‘free market’ conveniently excludes political alliances and policy. In that idealized framework, prices coordinate supply and demand. The reality is that policymakers nudge both the supply and demand curves, adopting laws that favor suppliers or consumers.”

Abel said, “So you admit that the unregulated free market model misrepresents reality. Why is your group such a champion of markets with as little regulation as possible?”

Cain responded, “In a representative democracy, policymakers try to maximize their power and influence within the political system. They want to get reelected so the choices they make benefit their constituents.”

Abel interjected, “Yes, but not all of their constituents. Just the most influential, the most powerful.”

Cain nodded. “True enough. Naturally, that interferes with the price system. The political ‘market’ is entirely different than the market for goods and services. The political system has an entirely different cost and benefit structure. Policymakers are rewarded when they conform to the strategies of party leaders, or they bear the cost of being marginalized in committees where policymaking happens.”

Abel countered, “Yes, but its not realistic to analyze the economic system without the influence of the political system. Policymakers grant patents and copyrights, enact bankruptcy laws and thousands of measures that affect property rights. Those rights are the foundation of the economic system.”

Cain argued, “I’ll grant you that. But any assignment of property rights should be done to minimize further political involvement. Let private agents working within the price system make adjustments to circumstances.”

Abel said, “In a 2012 interview Ronald Coase (1910 – 2013) pointed out the price system is expensive because buyers and sellers need to know a lot to reach a bargain. Your group says that policymakers should step in once, make a rule and let buyers and sellers take that rule into account as they negotiate transactions. Those ongoing transaction costs are more expensive than the ongoing cost of regulating the market.”

Cain shook his head. “Our group disagrees. Remember, people don’t obey the letter of the regulations. They are always trying to minimize their costs or maximize their gain within that regulatory framework. Our group favors a system with minimal ongoing political regulation. Let the individuals within the market police themselves.”

Abel asked, “How are people living next to a dry cleaners supposed to police the owners of the dry cleaners? The solvent they use is perchloroethylene, commonly called ‘perc,’ and it’s a toxic air pollutant. The neighbors don’t have the expertise to monitor the equipment at the dry cleaners, to make sure that there are no leaks, and that filtration is installed and adequately maintained.”

Cain responded, “Policymakers can assign responsibility. In a 2013 podcast, economist Don Boudreaux noted that lawmakers usually decide that the person responsible for a harm is the party that has the lowest cost in avoiding or preventing that harm. In this case, the owners of the dry cleaners have a much lower cost than the surrounding neighbors.”

Abel argued, “That establishes the dry cleaners as the responsible party. Some regulatory agency must regularly inspect the establishment to make sure they are in compliance with the law. The price system cannot reach some idealistic equilibrium of perc because the equilibrium point is zero. The supply and demand model is an appropriate tool to analyze a market for goods and services where there is some distribution of benefits and costs. In the case of the dry cleaners, the benefit of using perc is concentrated in the owners of the business. It is a critical component of the service they offer. The costs are widely distributed to the surrounding neighborhood.”

Cain countered, “The use of dry-cleaning chemicals benefits the customers who get their clothes dry-cleaned. The owners of the business are just a distribution point of those benefits. If the benefits were entirely concentrated in the business, there would be no dry-cleaning businesses. There would be no political support for those businesses and lawmakers would ban them. This only proves the point that market failures are a result of policy decisions. In this case it is zoning regulations. Dry cleaners serve a public demand and operate in the vicinity of their customers because the public wants the convenience.”

Abel interjected, “That convenience impacts the health of the people surrounding the dry cleaners whether they get their clothes dry-cleaned or not. Those health consequences are a negative externality that the customers don’t pay for. The price system can’t handle a situation like that.”

Cain objected, “There could be a ‘perc’ charge for every piece of clothing dry-cleaned. That would reduce the volume of business.”

Abel argued, “But there is no way for the business owners to recompense the neighbors for the extra risk of living close to a dry cleaners.”

Cain responded, “In a free market system, residents would pay lower rents and house prices as long as the risks were made public. That would be an indirect benefit.”

Abel replied, “Why must poorer people pay the price of pollution? Who gets the ‘perc’ charge that is added on? The city or state? Certainly not the people affected by it. The price system only accounts for the benefits and costs of the parties to a transaction. The price system simply doesn’t respond to externalities like pollution. What about monopolists? Unlike suppliers in a competitive market monopolists maximize their profits by selling fewer goods at a higher price.”

Cain’s voice was resolute. “That only proves the point that behind every market failure is a policy failure. Companies become monopolists through some set of policies that grants them some exclusive property right. If an industry is profitable, it will attract competitors.”

Abel scoffed. “That’s textbook economics – not the real world. A business may become a leader in an industry because it builds a better widget. Then it buys up its competitors and uses economies of scale to rule an industry. Google and Facebook are good examples.”

Cain argued, “They became monopolists because they bought political influence to systematically eliminate any threats to their dominance. Section 230 gave Google and Facebook immunity from liability for user posts. Lawmakers had good intentions. The internet was new,  and lawmakers wanted to encourage growth. By removing legal constraints, they inadvertently created the ideal environment for monopolists. It’s a recurrent pattern. I’ll adapt Milton Friedman’s remark on inflation and say, ‘Market failures are always and everywhere policy failures.’ Monopolists lobby for laws that enable then protect their market power. Unlike prices, laws are rigid and don’t respond to the changing circumstances of supply and demand.”

Abel said, “Let’s explore more of monopoly power next week. I’m thinking of Joan Robinson’s innovative thinking about monopsony, where there is one buyer and a lot of sellers.”

Cain responded, “And public goods. Let’s not forget those. See you next week.”

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Photo by Elena Mozhvilo on Unsplash

Birch, S. (2018). Demand-based models and market failure in health care: Projecting shortages and surpluses in doctors and nurses. Health Economics, Policy and Law, 14(2), 291–294. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1744133118000336

Pindyck, R. S., & Rubinfeld, D. L. (2017). Microeconomics. New York, NY: Pearson Education Limited.

Stern, N., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2021). The social cost of carbon, risk, distribution, market failures: An alternative approach. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3785806

Friedman’s more repeated quote is “Inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” Less well-known is his remark that “Inflation is the one form of taxation that can be imposed without legislation.” https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Milton_Friedman