September 28, 2025
By Stephen Stofka
This week I have been reading Jill Lepore’s recently published book We the People. She writes about our legal and legislative institutions and processes, but it is very much a book about people. What became clear to me while reading the book is that we deny others agency and rights in order to protect our own agency and interests. We defend our values and point of view in defiance of accusations of prejudice.
To keep this within a reasonable reading length, I will break this down into two parts. This week, I’ll discuss the topics in Lepore’s book. Next week, I will use some examples in Lepore’s book to explore the similarities and contrasts in political ideology and judicial interpretation.
Lepore explores the history of trying to amend the Constitution. Only a few of the more than 12,000 amendments proposed to Congress in the past 225 years have been ratified. Throughout the country’s history there have been repeated attempts to amend Article 5 of the Constitution, the article that sets the rules for an amendment’s ratification. An amendment must win two-thirds of the vote in both houses of Congress before it is sent to the states for ratification. Three-quarters of the states must ratify it before the amendment is added to the Constitution.
Leverage of power by a small minority had weakened the colonies under the Articles of Confederation and led to the drafting of the Constitution. Because of the three-fifths rule that counted slaves as three-fifths of a person, slavery gave the southern states excessive representation in Congress and in the Electoral College. Naturally, the slave states wanted to expand slavery to new territories and states to preserve and enhance those advantages. As the country expanded after the 1803 Louisiana Purchase, the framers knew that the ratification requirements set out in Article 5 were too onerous. The southern states and the newer states commanded far more legislative power despite their smaller populations. They used that power to block any amendments that threatened their advantage.
Throughout the country’s history, the amendment process has produced a lurching effect. Long periods of Constitutional inaction are followed by several amendments when there is a shift in popular sentiment and one party gains an electoral advantage strong enough to complete the obstacle path of ratification.
In the first part of the 19th century, sixty years passed without an amendment jumping the high hurdle set by Article 5. The deaths of 600,000 soldiers in the Civil War changed that political landscape, and the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments were passed. Another 45 years went by before the four amendments of the so-called progressive movement passed during the Wilson era. These included the 16th amendment permitting the federal government to tax income, the 17th amendment enacting the direct election of senators, the 18th amendment prohibiting the sale of alcohol, and the 19th amendment, giving women the right to vote.
Lepore notes that there are two ways to amend the constitution. The first is by actual amendment and ratification. The second is through judicial interpretation. Because ratification is such an arduous process, each party tries to amend the constitution through judicial interpretation. There are two types of constitutional interpretation, statutory and contractual. A statutory approach reads the text of the Constitution as though it were a statute. A contractual approach regards the Constitution as a contract between states. Understanding the intention of the parties involved is key to deciding case law. That understanding may require the use of historical documents and other secondary sources.
Who decides how to interpret the Constitution? Jefferson and Madison favored a contractual reading, which emphasizes the mutual consent of the parties to the contract. The sanctity of contract was so important to the framers that Section 10 of Article I prohibits the states from passing any “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts” (Source). Both men were advocates of the principle of nullification, that a state had a right to nullify any federal law that the state thought was unconstitutional. Hamilton and Adams preferred a statutory approach, relying solely on the text (p. 149-150. Note: any references I made with just page numbers will be to Lepore’s book).
Lepore writes, “Early Americans talked about their Constitution the way the English talked about theirs, less as a bucket of words than as a bag of principles. As Protestants, they considered any claim to an exclusive authority to interpret the meaning of scripture to be an act of religious oppression” (p. 149). A decade after the ratification of the Constitution chief Justice, John Marshall disagreed.
In the 1805 landmark case of Marbury versus Madison, Marshall established the principal that it is the Supreme Court that determines the meaning of the Constitution. Jefferson was President, and Madison was Secretary of State at the time of the decision, and neither agreed with this reasoning but Marshall’s decision scored a win for the administration so they did not protest. Under this principle, a few people, usually men, decide what the Constitution means. The formal process of amendment ratification requires thousands of people to agree.
Because it is so difficult to amend the Constitution, Congress and advocacy groups have tried to amend the constitution through judicial interpretation. The Executive and the Senate align to appoint federal judges and justices on the Supreme Court who will interpret the law in accordance with a political ideology. As early as 1801, a lame duck Federalist Congress reshaped the judiciary and Federalist President John Adams rushed to fill new positions in his last days in office (Source).
A strong disagreement with a Court’s decision has sometimes been the impetus for the passage of an amendment. The 14th amendment overrode the Supreme Court’s 1857 Dred Scott decision that all Negroes, slave or free, could not be American citizens (Source). The 16th amendment was passed to override the Supreme Court’s 1895 decision that a federal income tax was illegal (Source).
Let’s say that there are two broad types of judicial interpretations. One of those is that the constitution is fixed or, in Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia’s words, “It’s dead. Dead, dead, dead!” (p. 527). This type of interpretation tries to minimize any reliance on what the text implies, to “read between the lines.” Scalia adopted a form of originalism which Jack Rakove called “public meaning originalism” (Source). This school of originalism uses historical sources to understand the public meaning of the text of Constitution when it was written. This is essentially a statutory approach that I mentioned earlier. In the 1875 case Minor v Happersett, the Court ruled that the 14th Amendment did not guarantee women’s suffrage. In a strict textual interpretation of the amendment, the Court decided that suffrage was not explicitly included and could not be implied in the general phrase “privileges and immunities.”
In contrast, Chief Justice Roger Taney supported his opinion in the 1857 Dred Scott decision with a school of originalism that searches for the original intent of the framers (p. 212). That school relies less on the Constitutional text itself and more on traditional practice (Maltz, 2007). Taney wrote:
When the Constitution was adopted, they were not regarded in any of the States as members of the community which constituted the State, and were not numbered among its “people or citizens.” Consequently, the special rights and immunities guarantied to citizens do not apply to them. And not being “citizens” within the meaning of the Constitution, they are not entitled to sue in that character in a court of the United States, and the Circuit Court has not jurisdiction in such a suit. (Source)
The second interpretative approach is that of retired Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, who regarded the Constitution as a living document of values, principles and purposes, a contract between people and the governments who represent them (Breyer, 2024, p. xvii). The text of the Constitution points to the issues in the debate and cannot be the final word. As Jack Rakove (1996) pointed out in his book Original Meanings, there were inconsistencies in the wording of the hand-copied texts that were sent to the various states for ratification. In Breyer’s view, a judge’s task is to balance individual rights and the objectives of government policy.
Scalia and Breyer often debated in public (Breyer, p. 33). Scalia thought Breyer’s approach was ungrounded and arbitrary. Breyer thought that Scalia’s approach was too mechanical. He argued that an originalist approach did not achieve the objectiveness it aimed for. Since Scalia’s death in 2016, the Court’s conservative justices have struggled to apply an originalist interpretation in a consistent manner. They pick and choose the history that supports their opinions and reject the research and opinions of historians who come to different conclusions.
In Chapter 13, Lepore details this conflict in Second Amendment cases. After Justice Thomas invented a “text, history and tradition” test in writing the majority opinion in the Bruen decision, lower courts struggled to apply this multi-faceted analysis that combined both a textual emphasis and a historical-traditionalist approach. The confusion prompted another case, U.S. v Rahini, in which most of the conservative justices wrote separate opinions either concurring or dissenting with the majority decision (Source).
Lepore’s book is both informative and entertaining. She introduces us to long dead historical figures whose legacy affects our everyday lives and institutions. She takes us to seminal moments in history to give the reader a sense of time and place. She provides insightful analysis into the impassioned conflict between interests and principles. Next week, I will compare and contrast some of the judicial opinions and justices in Lepore’s book. Until then, baseball fans will have to content themselves with the start of an exciting playoff season!
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Photo by Rob Curran on Unsplash
Breyer, S. G. (2024). Reading the Constitution: Why I chose pragmatism, not textualism. Simon & Schuster.
Maltz, E. M. (2007). Dred Scott and the politics of slavery. University Press of Kansas.
Rakove, J. N. (1996). Original meanings: Politics and ideas in the making of the Constitution. Knopf.