Category: neoclassical economics

Solow’s Growth Machine

Leave a comment

December 24, 2023

by Stephen Stofka

I will start off this week’s letter with a look at the assumptions of neoclassical economics. I will finish up with some thoughts on the contributions of Robert Solow, a Nobel laureate who died this week at the age of 99. His growth model was built on neoclassical foundations and is still a workhorse of intermediate level macroeconomics.

In the late 19th century, several economists blended mathematics and utility theory to separate the study of economics from political economy. They thought that they could study human behavior with the same quantitative analysis that physicists and engineers used to make predictions about the mechanical world. To make their analysis consistent with established mathematical principles they made several assumptions regarding both consumer choice and the production process. I’ll begin with consumer choices.

The first assumption was that individual choice making was rational. This meant that people had preferences for some goods over others and could construct bundles of goods that would maximize their utility, or satisfaction. These preferences were consistent and independent of circumstances like income. For instance, a person might not be able to afford a steak but they preferred steak to ground beef. The ordering of preferences was complete. A person either preferred this bundle of goods to that bundle of goods, or preferred that over this, or considered them equal.

In order to predict human behavior, the neoclassicals assumed that humans behaved predictably. Behavioral economists challenged those assumptions as unrealistic. We may try to optimize our satisfaction but our lives are a series of circumstances partly determined by our prior choices and circumstances. Because of this our preferences change. Our “priors” introduce biases into our decision making that sabotage our attempts to maximize our utility. We want to put a decision behind us so we may shorten a lengthy examination of options and choose something just to have it done. This is known as decision fatigue. The choice of a hotel room while on vacation might be an example. Ratings systems address this fatigue.

A second assumption was that the market clears, balancing supply and demand so that there is no surplus or shortage. At this equilibrium is the market clearing price. A surplus or shortage would introduce some serial correlation into the price analysis and raise the likelihood that errors in the data were not random. A third assumption was that people form expectations by reducing the errors in prior expectations. This was later formalized as a concept called rational expectations but it was based on the idea that people optimized their satisfaction. These assumptions interpret human behavior so that our behavior is amenable to mathematical modeling and statistical validity. How realistic are they? The law of inertia models motion under the assumptions that there is no gravity or friction.  Although unrealistic, it is the basis for accurate prediction. In 1966, economist Milton Friedman wrote “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” a seminal paper asserting that a valid test of an assumption was not how likely or reasonable it seemed but its ability to enable accurate prediction.

In analyzing the production process, the neoclassicals assumed that the proportions of the factors of production were consistent. If the production costs for an industry were half labor and half capital, they were always in those proportions. In order to make production amenable to differential analysis, the neoclassicals pretended that production was continuous and incremental, even when it was seasonal or halting. They assumed that the output from production was constant, or constant returns to scale. X number of inputs went into the production function in certain proportions and the same Y output came out. The neoclassicals assumed that savings were automatically turned into investment. When the Great Depression of the 1930s showed that the process was not automatic, the neoclassical analysis could not explain it.

The neoclassicals failed to predict the extraordinary growth in productivity during the twentieth century. In the thinking of some economists, growth was inherently uneven and would introduce market instability that made it more difficult to reach equilibrium. In 1956 Robert Solow and Trevor Swan independently published papers that introduced a model where technological innovation enhanced labor productivity. The higher productivity led to higher savings rates which led to a higher rate of investment. Policies that encourage investment would lead to more efficient use of that investment and a steady rate of economic growth.

Like the neoclassical economists, the Solow-Swan models assumed that savings were turned into investment. With that increased investment, companies adjusted the mix of capital and labor used in production. The ratio of capital (K) to labor (L) inputs, the K/L ratio, kept increasing. In a medium term of like ten years, higher savings and investment led to higher economic growth. But greater investment increased depreciation costs so that savings and depreciation rates competed with each other. In the long-term of two or more decades, their models described a steady state of balanced growth. Capital, effective labor and economic output would approach the same rate of growth.

In their steady state model, technological innovation was an exogenous factor, meaning that it was not generated or explained by the model. In studying developing countries, other economists realized the importance of property rights protection. Policies and institutions must encourage investment and afford some assurance that the fruits of R&D research will be protected. Without this sense of security, investors must account for the risk that their research will be copied and the resulting loss of profits will impact projections of long term cash flows. This dampens investment in those countries with low property rights protection. Consequently there is a low amount of R&D investment and the people within those countries become stuck in a trap.

Nobel laureates are recognized for their contribution to a field of study. Their ideas and their analytical approach became an incubator for more research, more questions, discussion and controversy. As growth theory and development economics have evolved, they have incorporated the ideas of Robert Solow. He was born in the early 1920s when electricity was ushering in large gains in mechanical productivity. He died when those same electrical currents are powering a revolution in information processing. His birth and death are the bookends of a century of transformation.

///////////////

Photo by Mike Hindle on Unsplash

Keywords: neoclassical economics, consumer, production, steady state, growth theory, Solow

The Choices We Steer By

Leave a comment

October 29, 2023

by Stephen Stofka

Last week’s letter explored income and wealth distribution within a framework that involves choice as well  as chance. The emphasis on choice was first presented in a 1953 paper by the Nobel economist Milton Friedman. This week’s letter develops the implications of Friedman’s speculation.

Friedman suggested that a wage implicitly contained an insurance premium charged by employers for reducing an employee’s income risk. Debt instruments involve an ongoing relationship between debtor and creditor and carry a risk premium that is a component of the interest rate on the debt. The employer-employee relationship is an ongoing financial relationship as well. An employee’s desire for a consistent income leads them to accept a lower income, a tradeoff of some income for some certainty about future income. This implies that a worker’s wage is not just the marginal product of their labor, a bedrock assumption of neoclassical economics. A worker who has a tolerance for more risk will demand higher pay from an employer, reducing the insurance premium embedded in a wage.

During economic crises when there is higher unemployment, employers should be able to charge a higher risk premium, i.e. a lower wage, to workers who would have a greater desire for certainty. But wages are slow to decline during these times. In Chapter 17 of the General Theory, Keynes claimed that wages were “sticky.” Economists attributed it to union wage contracts that do not respond to changing circumstances. Today union membership in the U.S. is less than 10% of the workforce, reducing that as a causal factor in this country. So why don’t workers accept much lower wages to obtain work?

Employers and employees bargain over the price of certainty, each of them aware that certainty at any price is in short supply. In times of stress, employees may be concerned that a smaller employer, the implicit insurer of a worker’s wage, cannot provide the degree of income safety that the lower wage would purchase. Because the employer-employee relationship is a persistent one, employees are concerned that working for a much lower wage might set a precedent that is not easily undone. When economic conditions improve, how likely is an employer to restore wages to their former levels? This was a point of contention in ongoing wage negotiations between the UAW – the auto workers’ union – and car manufacturers. During the financial crisis, the union made wage concessions to help the automobile companies stay in business. When business improved, wage increases were based on the reduced wages. Recent hires were paid less than a delivery driver for Amazon.

In the closing decades of the 19th century, neo-classical economists like Stanley Jevons, Francis Edgeworth, Leon Walras and Alfred Marshall cleaved Economics away from Political Economy in an effort to treat economics as a mechanistic science of exchange. They argued that an employee’s wage was just a factor of production like machines and land. They excluded from their analysis the political and legal constructs that protected private property and the social institutions that were a part of the community that surrounded firms and their employees. The wage was a component of the marginal cost to produce one more unit of whatever the company sold. Economists called it the marginal product of labor, or MPL.

There was a moral implication that employees were being paid their “fair share” of the cost to bring the next unit into production. This model suggested that employees who demanded higher wages wanted to be paid more than their marginal product, or more than they deserved. This provided moral justification and political appeal when employers clashed with employees over wages and working conditions. In 1877, railroad owners convinced West Virginia Governor Henry Mathews to provide state militia to end a workers’ strike (White, 2019, 347).

In the late 19th century there were few legal protections and no social insurance programs for workers. Today an employer acts as an insurance broker for a host of mandated government insurance programs. These include Social Security, unemployment insurance and workers’ compensation. An employer does not provide mandated benefits for free. They are included in an employer’s labor costs and deducted from an employee’s wage. Neither employer nor employee have any choice in these government mandated insurances. The choice an employee does have is how much they must pay their employer for income stability. The employer may charge that fee in many ways. These include a lower wage or the expectation that employees will work varying shifts or staggered hours. The employer may include other working conditions in the employment bargain that require compromise from the employee. This is all part of the insurance premium that an employer charges for providing future income certainty.

An employee’s choice whether to pay that insurance premium is bounded by their expectations, personal circumstances and the broader economy. An employee who asks for a higher wage, refuses to work a varying schedule or declines working overtime risks negative consequences. If the job market looks poor, the employee is more likely to comply with employer demands. An employer calculates the degree of difficulty to replace that employee and the “domino effect” of a higher wage on other employees in the company. Employers may stress confidentiality but employees often spread news of a wage increase, or the lack of one, to their coworkers. This is a series of opportunity cost calculations made by both employers and employees.

In the late 19th century, economists devised a mechanistic interpretation of human interaction that is still a component of economic studies today. Bargaining between parties is illustrated by supply-demand diagrams, Edgeworth boxes and other graphical teaching tools. Keynes’ 1936 General Theory is entirely founded on the principle that investors bargain with uncertainty but it wasn’t until the following decade that economists incorporated game theory into their analysis. Friedman’s 1953 paper was an exploration of the choices that underlay the dynamics of economic relationships. Like Keynes, Friedman was fascinated with the interaction between choice and chance in our lives. Chance is like being in a raft on a river. Our choices are like oars that help us navigate the perils of the moving water and the hidden rocks in our way. Throughout his life, Friedman pointed out the hidden aspects of our lives.

/////////////

Photo by Bluewater Sweden on Unsplash

Keywords: marginal product of labor, neoclassical economists, wages, insurance, uncertainty

White, R. (2019). The Republic for which it stands: The United States during reconstruction and the gilded age, 1865-1896. Oxford University Press.