A Web of Rules and Interpretations

June 1, 2025

By Stephen Stofka

This is part of a series on persistent problems. The conversations are voiced by Abel, a Wilsonian with a faith that government can ameliorate social and economic injustices to improve society’s welfare, and Cain, who believes that individual autonomy, the free market and the price system promote the greatest good.

Abel said, “What caught my attention this week was an article about some woman from Hong Kong being arrested and jailed prior to deportation (Source).”

Cain frowned. “Small Missouri town, wasn’t it?”

Abel nodded. “I forget the name of the town, but it voted heavily for Trump. Like 80%. This woman had lived in the town for twenty years, had a few kids. She worked as a waitress in the local restaurant and was well-liked by the folks in town. The arrest caught the town off guard. One person said they thought Trump was going to go after gang members and criminals, not mothers.”

Cain shrugged. “If I remember right, she had been in some fake marriage like twenty years ago to get a green card.”

Abel replied, “Yeah. She wasn’t convicted or anything. Back in the 1970s, I knew someone who got paid $10,000 to marry a Hungarian woman. That was a lot of money in those days. Hungary was behind the Iron Curtain, so there were a lot of people anxious to get out.”

Cain asked, “What did they do after they got married?”

Abel replied, “Went their separate ways, although they both had the same address. After a few years, they divorced. I think that was paid for, as well.”

Cain said, “Back to that Hong Kong woman. Almost half of the illegal immigrants in this country came in on visas and simply didn’t leave (Source). DHS reported record estimates of overstays in 2022 under the Biden Administration (Source).”

Abel argued, “Yeah, but a lot of those were from Venezuela. It’s basically a failed state. The UN estimated almost 8 million have left the country since 2014 (Source). That’s more than 25% of the 29 million people in the 2010 census.”

Cain frowned. “And the majority are coming here, it seems.”

Abel shook his head. “No, about 85% have gone to South and Central American countries. It’s a strain on the entire hemisphere. Syria is another country with a refugee crisis, but that was the result of a civil war. Almost half the population had to flee because of Assad’s war against his own people (Source). That doesn’t include all the internally displaced people who had to flee their homes and villages. In Venezuela, Maduro has destroyed his country’s economy. If people can’t eat, they got to leave.”

Cain sighed. “If they can leave. Look at Gaza.”

Abel nodded. “The largest prison in the world. A prison with no food. If we start talking about Gaza, my food will get cold.”

Cain said, “A country has to have rules and procedures for who can come in and how long they can stay. Who is a citizen? Who is not?”

Abel argued, “We didn’t have any rules for 80 years. Not until after the Civil War.”

Cain shook his head. “No way. The 1790 Naturalization Act limited citizenship to free white persons only. The Constitution hadn’t even been ratified yet. It’s the first time that the phrase ‘under the jurisdiction of’ appeared. It also included birthright citizenship (Source).”

Abel frowned. “No, that was the 14th Amendment.”

Cain smiled. “No, not for kids born here. Birthright citizenship for children born overseas if their parents were U.S. citizens.”

Abel was surprised. “So certain populations could immigrate here and work here but couldn’t become citizens.”

Cain nodded. “No Muslims, no Chinese. In a few decades, Congress added residency requirements for naturalization. People had to show proof when they entered the country. It was never an open door policy. All that ‘give me your tired, your poor’ stuff.”

Abel replied, “An open door for workers, but a lot of workers couldn’t be citizens.”

Cain raised his eyebrows. “Right. So, during the drafting of the 14th Amendment after the Civil War, the Senators argued over the wording of Section 1. Would the final wording include the children of Chinese immigrants (Source)? They agreed that it would.”

Abel asked, “Why was there a Supreme Court case about it then?”

Cain grunted softly. “This was in 1898, after Congress had passed the Chinese Exclusion Act barring citizenship specifically for all Chinese.”

Abel interrupted, “For like a hundred years, the British and Americans treated China really badly.”

Cain nodded. “And they haven’t forgotten it, either. The case was about Wong Kim Ark. Ark, like Noah’s ark. His parents were legally in the country when he was born but then they returned to China. So, when he was 21, he went back to China to visit them. When he returned to the U.S., authorities claimed that he couldn’t be a citizen and wouldn’t let him back in (Source). The court ruled that the birthright clause in the 14th Amendment gave Ark citizenship.”

Abel said, “And that’s where it’s stood for more than hundred years. Then Trump issued his executive order a few months ago.”

Cain tilted his head. “Not quite. I’ve heard about the ‘jurisdiction’ argument for some time. In 2010, Peter Schuck, a Yale professor, wrote an op-ed in the New York Times explaining some of the arguments against an outright grant of citizenship to anyone born in the U.S. (Source). He mentioned anchor babies. That’s like where a woman crosses the border …”

Abel interrupted, “or overstays a tourist visa like some Chinese women have done.”

Cain nodded. “That too. But anyhow, has a baby shortly after coming into the country. Did the framers of the 14th Amendment mean to include those children? Given the history of immigration laws in this country during the 19th century, that seems unlikely to a lot of people.”

Abel argued, “Even though the parents were here illegally, they were still subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S.”

Cain sighed. “The Ark precedent never settled the question of the parents’ status because Ark’s parents did have a right to live and work in the U.S. at the time their son was born. But what if your parents do not have permission to be here? What does it mean to be ‘subject to the jurisdiction’ of some country? Sure, some sheriff can arrest you and hold you, but the local district has no legal jurisdiction over you the way they would with an American citizen.”

Abel asked, “But we don’t penalize children for the sins or transgressions of their parents. If my parents owe money to some creditor and they die, that debt does not pass on to me.”

Cain agreed. “Schuck mentioned that. He was discussing the arguments on both sides.”

Abel nodded. “Right. Why should the legal status of my parents matter? If I am born in the U.S., badda-bing, I’m a U.S. citizen.”

Cain shrugged. “Depends on how the court reads the phrase “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof’ in Section 1.”

Abel shook his head. “What is a hospital supposed to do when a kid is born? Start checking the status of their parents? It’s a hospital, not an immigration court or the DHS.”

Cain nodded. “Yeah, there’s the practical side. Shuck suggested a compromise where a kid would spend so many years in school, perhaps, before they could become a citizen. Establish a connection to the U.S. Some European countries do that.”

Abel laid his fork down. “What about the status of all the kids that have been born in the past few decades. Are they suddenly going to become stateless?”

Cain shook his head. “Don’t ask me. The conservative justices will be looking at history and tradition at the time of the 14th Amendment.”

Abel’s tone was frustrated. “They’ve overturned Roe. They’ve nullified campaign finance laws in Citizens United. Money is speech! Who knew?”

Cain leaned forward and said in a hushed voice,  “I can hear you.”

Abel settled back in his seat. “Right, sorry. Anyway, the court adopted a whole new reading of the First Amendment in that case. Then they reinterpreted the Second Amendment in the Heller and Bruen decisions. Last year, they gave the President the immunity of a king in their reading of Article 2 of the Constitution. What’s next? Why don’t they just rewrite the entire Constitution?”

Cain smiled. “The Democrats have no one to blame but themselves. They were the ones who did away with the Senate filibuster rule for judges in 2013. Confirmation required only a majority vote, not the sixty votes required for a filibuster.”

Abel argued, “That was because the Republicans were blocking the appointment of many lower court judges as a matter of tactics, not ideology. Harry Reid, the Majority Leader, had no realistic choice.”

Cain replied, “That’s a matter of perception. The Senate is a tit-for-tat institution. When Republicans got the majority, they extended that exclusion from the filibuster to confirmations of  Supreme Court justices.”

Abel looked glum. “Then Trump appointed three extremists to the bench during his first administration.”

Cain asked, “Extremists? Anyway, whose fault was that? People had advised Justice Ginsburg to step down while Obama was in office. She was in her eighties, and had multiple health problems, including cancer (Source). Like a lot of politicians in Washington, she tripped on her big ego. I admire Justice Breyer for stepping down a few years ago while he was still in good health.”

Abel replied, “I read his book Reading the Constitution. He claims that a pragmatic interpretation of the law is better than an originalist or textual reading. He wrote, wait a second, I highlighted it. A jurist should ‘appeal more directly to values than a rules-based approach would advise’ (page 140).”

Cain frowned. “If there are several values, how much weight to give each individual value? Maybe freedom in one decision, civic order in another.”

Abel asked, “So you would argue that Scalia’s approach was more consistent?”

Cain nodded. “Yeah, I think a jurist has to ask themselves ‘what was the purpose of this law when it was written?’”

Abel said, “Breyer mentions that Scalia’s chief concern was the original intent of the law” (page 139). The framers of the Constitution argued over every clause. The final language tried to strike a balance between two principles, or two values. I think that’s what Justice Breyer was getting at.”

Cain asked, “So Breyer would have been looking for two values that needed to be balanced?”

Abel shrugged. “He didn’t say that. It’s more my thought based on what Breyer wrote and James Madison’s account of what the framers argued about during the Constitutional Convention (Source). I was trying to come up with a simple rule of constitutional interpretation. I like the balancing of values test.”

Cain nodded. “I like that method because it reminds me of the balance between supply and demand. My rule about limiting exceptions is when making the law, not interpreting the law. I think I agree with Scalia that justices should try to figure out what was the purpose of the law, the original intent, then come up with a simple rule that can be applied in the circumstances of the case before the court.”

Abel frowned. “You said the rule in the Heller decision wasn’t well constructed. Scalia wrote that decision.”

Cain shrugged. “Just because Scalia wrote it doesn’t mean it meets my test for a good rule.”

Abel argued, “Very often, lawmakers do not want to state the intent of a law. What they do is construct a process, a set of procedural rules to achieve a stated purpose. Take, for example, the 1924 Immigration Act. Republicans wanted to maintain a homogenous population of English and those from northern European countries. They already had a quota system in place, so that it allowed more immigration from those favored countries and restricted those from less desirable countries in southern Europe and other parts of the world.”

Cain shook his head. “Maybe the purpose was not stated, particularly in earlier laws. The justices should be able discern the purpose from auxiliary sources. There would have hearings, Congressional notes, commentary from the press that linked to Congressional sources. That kind of stuff.”

Abel nodded. “I understand. My point is that the purpose of a law can be subject to interpretation. Scalia sold the idea of original intent as a more grounded approach, but it can be a complex interpretation that is mostly grounded by the court’s own biases. That’s what we’re seeing the past decade or so. You didn’t like the reasoning in Heller.”

Cain replied. “No, I didn’t. I liked the conclusion they reached, or at least part of it. The contradictions in the reasoning meant that more cases would come to the court because judges in the lower courts would not be able to apply the precedent consistently.”

Abel interrupted, “Yeah. You said that was the sign of a badly constructed rule or precedent.”

Cain nodded. “Right. Scalia wrote the Heller decision (Source) and he had an ego at least as big as Ginsburg’s. In the Heller decision, Scalia took on the role of English professor, analyzing the grammar construction in the Second Amendment.”

Abel asked, “Did Scalia study English before going to law school?”

Cain shrugged. “I don’t know whether he had any formal training in grammatical construction during the 18th and 19th century.”

Abel replied, “It does seem like a constitutional scholar would have to become familiar with that kind of construction.”

Cain nodded. “Yeah, but a judge would read only a narrow slice of literature from a time period. It hardly makes them an English scholar of that period.”

Abel said, “So back to the Second Amendment.”

Cain continued, “Scalia asserted that the prefatory clause in the Second Amendment, the one about the Militia, does not limit the operative clause stating that individuals have the right to own and bear arms.”

Abel frowned. “Well, a prefatory clause can explain the reasoning for an operative clause. We see that construction in Madison’s notes during the Constitutional Convention (Source). So there’s the original intent of the Second Amendment. End of story. If Scalia was basically going to ignore the prefatory clause about the Militia, then anyone could own a firearm. Convicted felons, crazy people.”

Cain nodded. “In 1791 when the Second Amendment was ratified, states did not ban weapons for those kind of people, although a few towns had some rules against it. Scalia claimed to be a champion of rules (Source), but the lack of rules at that time gave him a problem. If his grammatical analysis did not limit the right to bear arms, states could not legally bar people from owning a gun.”

Abel nodded. “A practical problem. Breyer wrote that originalist interpretations like Scalia’s didn’t look to the consequences of an interpretation (page 128), but this time, you’re saying that Scalia did have to look at that.”

Cain replied, “Sure. The 2008 Heller decision was a 5-4 vote. Remember that Scalia is most noted for his dissents, not his majority opinions (Source). A dissenting opinion can lay out bold principles because it doesn’t need to reach a consensus. This time, Scalia couldn’t afford to lose a vote, so he had to step back from a rigid application of his own rules.”

Abel asked, “You would not have done so?”

Cain replied, “First of all, I would have used some sources on English grammar to validate my grammatical analysis. Did a prefatory clause limit the operative clause in general use at that time? Not just in legal texts, but in newspapers, novels, et cetera. You need more than legal citations. ”

Abel asked, “So how did Scalia resolve his practical problem?”

Cain squinted for a moment. “He asserted a natural limit to all rights based on common law. Blackstone’s commentary on English law notes that no right is absolute (Source). The right of one person can interfere with the right of another person, with the body politic (Source).”

Abel nodded. “Competing interests, in other words. That balancing test I mentioned earlier. Balancing values and interests. So why can’t the state limit a person’s right to carry a gun in the interest of keeping civil order?”

Cain replied, “Yep, that’s a problem and Scalia doesn’t really clarify that competing interest thing.”

Abel asked, “You would have clarified it?”

Cain nodded. “Sure. It doesn’t take a genius to know that the issue of competing interests will come to the court again as the lower courts try to resolve cases involving these interests. And they did.”

Abel said, “The 2022 Bruen decision said that local jurisdictions could not require permits for self-defense outside the home. They had to use historical tradition to support their case.”

Cain replied, “Correct. The court gave deference to the right of self-defense over a competing state or local government interest.”

Abel argued, “But you said that there were few historical cases when the Second Amendment was written. So states would have to use 19th century traditions. What makes the 19th century so special?”

Cain shrugged. “Like I said. The reasoning is a mess. If there is little historical tradition at the time of the amendment’s ratification, that should be the historic tradition.”

Abel smirked. “So, in your world, we would all go around with six-shooters in holsters just like in the Westerns.”

Cain laughed. “Gimme a break. My reasoning wouldn’t ignore consequences the way Scalia does.”

Abel said, “So you do agree with Breyer. You’re a liberal at heart.”

Cain chuckled. “The price system does not ignore consequences. It is a balancing of interests between suppliers and consumers.”

Abel interrupted, “Consumers who are factors in the supply of what they consume.”

Cain nodded. “As workers. Ok, good point. Anyway, there is no price system in the law.”

Abel asked, “Could you invent one?”

Cain looked puzzled. “Could I? Of course not. But that raises a good question. Why didn’t a price system evolve in a democratic system?”

Abel replied, “That’s easy. Everyone gets one vote.”

Cain smiled. “In a competitive market, some people have more of a surplus than others. Resources and wealth are not distributed evenly. Demand is not distributed evenly. It’s that imbalance that spawns the price system. There’s too much balance in a democratic system for a price system to work. Each party tries to tear away at that balance, to make it unstable so that they can exert their will.”

Abel frowned. “So, what? Sell votes?”

Cam shook his head. “No, votes are like money. A medium of exchange for the transfer of power, for authority, for legitimacy.”

Abel asked, “Allocate votes to each voter based on how much power or authority is at stake?”

Cain smiled and slid out of the booth. “It’s certainly something to think about. I will see you next week.”

Abel laughed. “Next week, another episode of Pinky and the Brain, plotting to take over the world.”

Cain laughed. “Or at least try to understand it. My treat this week. See you then.”

//////////////////////

The Black Robes

July 28, 2024

by Stephen Stofka

This week’s letter continues my look at a method of judicial interpretation called textualism. For fifteen years, I have been writing regularly, trying to understand systems of power and thought that are bigger than my readers or myself. We are often unaware how much our daily lives are shaped by some ethical philosophy that guides the institutions that determine the rules we live by. Over the past two decades, the Roberts’ Court has increasingly used textualist interpretation to upend decades of precedent. The Court has overturned Roe, and several justices have same sex marriage protections in their sights as the next precedent to fall. They have redefined the Second Amendment as an individual right and set severe restrictions on affirmative action considerations used in college admissions.

The economist John Maynard Keynes once commented that we were slaves to the ideas of some defunct economist. The same can be said about judicial interpretation. Justice Scalia, the leading proponent of textualism on the Supreme Court, died several months before the 2016 election. Fellow Justice Alito indicated the reverence that conservative justices had for Scalia’s reasoning when he commented that they would ask “What would Scalia do?”

Stephen Breyer, another Associate Justice on the Court who retired in 2022, often held public debates with Scalia. In his book Reading the Constitution: Why I Chose Pragmatism, Not Textualism, Breyer recalls the irresolvable issues between the two justices. Breyer placed greater weight on the purpose of a law. Scalia emphasized the statutory text of a law and the “text’s original public meaning” (p. 28), a sub-branch of textualism called originalism. Sometimes a strict textualist approach conflicts with or contradicts an originalist approach. Richard Epstein (2014, p. 54) cautioned, “it is a dangerous mistake to conflate any form of originalism which asks how texts were understood when written, with strict textualism, which ignores those necessary but implied exceptions.”

Breyer (p. 25) writes that Scalia thought the textualist approach would create what Scalia himself called a “science of statutory interpretation.” In the 19th century, Jeremy Bentham, a founder of an influential philosophy called utilitarianism, wanted to become the “Newton of morals.” Bentham invented a “felicific calculus” to bring scientific and objective analysis to moral and ethical controversies. The calculus focused on the effect of an action, not its nature or the parties involved. Bentham’s goal was to design a system of moral reasoning that would make judicial sentences proportionate to the effect of a crime. A stolen chicken was a stolen chicken. It didn’t matter who was the owner of the chicken. Novel in its approach at the time, it has become the foundation of law, ethics and economics but the calculus itself seems rather quaint to students who are introduced to it in an ethics class. Like Bentham, Scalia wanted to develop a set of rules of judicial interpretation that would guide the drafting of statutes in Congress. Unfortunately, the Court’s textualist reasoning has created confusion in the lower courts.

Some of the confusion arises from the inconsistent application of textualist methods by the conservative justices. In the District of Columbia v Heller majority opinion authored by Scalia, he disregarded the first half of the text of the Second Amendment. The Amendment had been written to assure the state legislatures that the new federal government could not call up state militias, then collect their muskets and disband the militia, leaving states powerless against an autocratic federal government. In his majority opinion, Scalia dismissed the first half of the text as a prefatory clause imposing no limit on the meaning of the second half of the amendment’s text. That decision highlights the difficulty, if not impossibility, of being objective in legal or moral reasoning.

Ethicists have long grappled with a grounding problem, establishing a moral foundation for ethical evaluation. The folks at Crash Course Philosophy have an informative video. (I set the  playback speed to .75 to digest all the points they present). In ancient Greece, Socrates asked Euthyphro if the gods loved the pious because it was pious, or was something pious simply because the gods loved it. Twenty-five hundred years later, ethicists and jurists have not resolved this question, known as the Euthyphro dilemma. Is something inherently just or right, or do we simply make it so? Neither Scalia nor Bentham could escape the inherent self-centeredness of our perceptions. In Einstein’s terms of space-time, we are like the sun that bends the space around it. We bend the information that we receive so that it is difficult to find any objective agreement among human beings that will persist across time and culture.

The subjectivity of our perceptions can defeat any methodology in search of an unambiguous objectivity. I will pick a case from the Court’s current term to illustrate how textualist analysis can reach very different conclusions. Snyder v United States was a case testing the distinction between bribery and gratuity. James Snyder was a former mayor of Portage, Indiana who was charged and convicted of violating a federal law for a payment he received following the award of a contract for the purchase of some garbage trucks. Snyder was charged under §666 (the curlicue symbol denotes “paragraph”) of Title 18 of the U.S. Code:

“corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving any thing of value of $5,000or more.” §666(a)(1)(B).

Snyder argued that he did agree to any payment before the transaction and that   §666 applied only to bribes. Writing for the majority opinion of six conservative justices, Justice Kavanaugh distinguished between bribery, a payment before an act, and a gratuity, a payment after an act:

either (i) a reward given after the act with no agreement beforehand (gratuity)

or (ii) a reward given after the act pursuant to an agreement beforehand (bribe).

Although Kavanaugh distinguishes the two, why did Congress expand the scope of the law by including “or rewarded?” If they meant that §666 of the statute to apply only to bribery, they could have left the text unmodified. The addition to the text indicated to the dissenting three justices that Congress intended the amended text to apply to payments before and after the fact. However, a strict textualist approach ignores legislative history. Kavanaugh justified his reasoning because of the placement of an adverb “corruptly” in the statute. Kavanaugh looked to §201(b) covering bribery and §201(c) of the statute governing gratuities and found that only §201(b) used the word. Therefore, Kavanaugh reasoned, the use of “corruptly” in  §666 limits its application only to bribery.

The bribery statute for federal officials, §201(b), uses

the term “corruptly.” But the gratuities statute for federal

officials, §201(c), does not. The term “corruptly” therefore

signals that [18 U.S.C.] §666 is a bribery statute. And statutory

history, statutory structure, statutory punishments,

federalism, and fair notice strongly reinforce that textual

signal and together establish that §666 is a bribery statute.

Writing the dissenting opinion, Justice Jackson wrote, “To reach the right conclusion we need not march through various auxiliary analyses: We can begin—and end—with only the text.” Justice Jackson referred to a separate §215 that targeted bank employees who accepted bribes and gratuities. That  section of the text was used as a model for the language in §666, according to the House Reports of Congress at the time, and §666 duplicates the wording of §215. The majority opinion disregarded that salient fact.

At the heart of this controversy and others is the conservative dislike of federal interference in state affairs, a breach of federalism, mentioned twelve times in Kavanaugh’s opinion. Here is one example: “Interpreting §666 as a gratuities statute would significantly infringe on bedrock federalism principles.”

Congress awards federal money to states for various purposes, but local officials complete the transactions with national and local companies. It is perfectly understandable that Congress did not want local officials to profit from the disbursement of federal funds. However, Congress effectively made all jurisdictions subject to the law, expanding the scope of federal regulatory power. The federalism principle is nowhere in either the Constitution or the relevant statute but captures the idea of boundaries and separation of powers implied in the Constitution. Given that aversion to an expansion of power, a skilled jurist can use textualist analysis to serve whatever purpose they want.

A recurring theme in former Justice Breyer’s book is that textual analysis is as arbitrary as the traditional analysis it was meant to replace, an analysis guided by the purpose of a piece of legislation. Scalia thought that textualist interpretation would produce a set of rules that would guide legislators as they wrote the law. Out of all the justices on the Court, only Stephen Breyer had worked for a time in a legislative function, serving as counsel on Senator Edward Kennedy’s staff. Scalia knew little of the negotiations and deliberate obfuscations that legislators employ to build a consensus to pass a law. The ambiguity in statutory text is deliberate in some cases. Just as with the executive and legislative branches, justices have points of view, and they use their talents and experience to reinforce their perspective. Don’t be fooled by the black robes. There are human beings beneath the cloth.

These past weeks I have explored some aspects of the law as they relate to expectations. Because I am not a lawyer or a constitutional scholar, the research for these topics requires more time. I hope that readers have learned a bit as I expanded my own knowledge of these topics. I apologize in advance for any faults or omissions. Next week, I intend to turn to several topics on investment, the tradeoff between our current self and our future self when we delay consumption and save money.

///////////

20240728Courthouse.png

Photo by Gene Gallin on Unsplash

Keywords: ethics, utilitarianism, bribery, gratuity, textualism, originalism

Breyer, S. G. (2024). Reading the constitution: Why I chose pragmatism, not textualism. Simon & Schuster.

Epstein, Richard Allen. (2014). The classical liberal constitution: The uncertain quest for limited government. Harvard University Press.

The Reins of Judicial Power

July 21, 2024

by Stephen Stofka

This week’s letter is about an alliance of business interests and libertarians alarmed by the growing power of the federal government that emerged during the 1930s Depression and enabled by a shift in judicial interpretation on the Supreme Court. In the following decades, executive agencies expanded their authority by assuming powers held by each of the three branches (Epstein, 2014). The agencies wrote rules like a legislature, administered the rules with or without the assent of the President, and resolved controversies in legal interpretation like the judiciary. When the Court’s decisions challenged the traditions of religious groups, social conservatives joined the coalition.

Social unrest in the 1960s followed by political turmoil and economic stress in the 1970s accompanied a generational shift in power in the Congress. A coalition of civil rights advocates  and environmental activists helped pass legislation in both areas. In the southern states where resistance to federal control was still active a century after the Civil War, voter sentiment began to shift from the Democrat Party to the Republican Party. Extractive industry groups increased their lobbying efforts to check environmental laws that increased their costs or delayed their projects (Kraft, 2022). In the 1970s, environmental activist groups turned to the courts to block industrial developments (Smith, 2022). Many of these controversies occurred in federal district courts where 860 justices with life tenure decided the application of the rules. Business groups recognized the need for judges sympathetic to any judicial philosophy that promoted a diffusion of government power to the states and individual business interests. Large corporations, enjoying many of the legal rights of individual persons since the 19th century, had revenues greater than those of many state governments, allowing big businesses the power to steer state and local policy toward maximizing profits.

A hybrid form of judicial interpretation called textualism/originalism was an effort to develop objective rules of jurisprudence to guide decisions in the lower courts. Textualism focuses on the legislative text while originalism focuses on the history of statutes and the Constitution (Eyer, 2022). Together the rules encourage justices to stay faithful to the text, history and tradition of the law. Six justices on today’s current Supreme Court hold the reins of this team of horses, which sometimes pull in opposite directions. Four decades in development, textualism and originalism have not brought the sought after clarity. Lower courts have sometimes responded with contradictory decisions to recent Supreme Court precedents, resulting in a judicial recycling of controversies in which the Court clarifies an earlier precedent.

As executive agency power expanded in the decades following World War 2, the Supreme Court expanded individual rights in its interpretation of the 14th Amendment. Richard Epstein (2014, p. 121) voices the conservative sentiment when he called this period a “veritable explosion of new rights.” The 1973 Roe v. Wade decision overruled state laws that prohibited abortions at various stages in a pregnancy, determining a right to privacy in the 14th Amendment. Social conservatives, business interests and libertarians formed an alliance of think tanks to limit the expansion of judicial and executive power.

Conservatives decried the Court’s Roe v. Wade decision upon its publication. In an interview late in her life, liberal Justice Ginsburg faulted the reasoning the court gave in that decision. She explained that the decision should have been based on a principle of gender equality clearly stated in the 14th Amendment. The Court’s ruling, based on a presumption of privacy, left the decision vulnerable to repeated attacks by groups of social conservatives. A coalition of religious groups, still angry over the Court’s 1962 decisions banning prayer in schools, now found common cause with business interests angry about the expansion of executive agency power.

For some foundational understanding of this revolution in judicial interpretation, readers will remember that the Bill of Rights was a package of ten amendments submitted to the states for ratification in conjunction with the Constitution. They applied to the federal government and were meant to assuage any concerns that this newly created federal government would impinge on the rights and power of state legislatures and the small number of individual citizens allowed to vote in each colony (Klarman, 2016). The enumerated powers stated in the Constitution was designed to define and contain the powers of the federal government but left unsettled or undefined powers to the states. In the century following ratification, the Court’s rulings gave preferential treatment to state autonomy in controversies over Bill of Rights protections. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution gave the federal government priority if a federal law contradicted state law, but if there was no federal law resolving a controversy, state law took precedence. Separation of powers included the three branches within the federal government and between the federal government and the states.

For an evolving history of jurisprudence, I will turn to the National Constitution Center, a bipartisan independent organization authorized by Congress to educate the public on the history, text and meaning of the Constitution. They offer a free curriculum of classes on the Constitution for readers who want to expand their knowledge of the controversies related to the Constitution and its Amendments. What follows is a synthesis of a class section on selective incorporation, the Court’s application of protections for individuals to the states law.

Following the passage of the 14th Amendment, several Supreme Court decisions limited its protections against state abuses. In the 1925 Gitlow v. New York decision, the Court held that a state could not violate an individual’s First Amendment rights. In the 1960s the Supreme Court, headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren, further expanded individual rights, reasoning that the due process and equal protections guaranteed by the 14th Amendment made Bill of Rights protections applicable to the states as well as the federal government.

Before the rulings of the Warren Court, individuals had few protections against abuses by state governments. States routinely violated protections against search and seizure contained in the Fourth Amendment, the right to counsel stated in the Sixth Amendment, the protection against self-incrimination in the Fifth Amendment, and the right to free speech in the First Amendment. As I noted last week, a minority of rural voters in some states controlled the legislature through clever districting rules that magnified their representation and interests in the state legislature.

As the court has applied combinations of textualist and originalist interpretation, it has satisfied the wishes of the coalition of social conservatives, business interests and libertarians. Its Dobbs decision overruled the 50-year-old precedent set by Roe v. Wade, pleasing social conservatives. It overruled previous precedent set by the Bakke decision in 1978 that established affirmative action, pleasing business interests and libertarians. In 2008, its Heller decision established an individual right to own a gun, satisfying libertarians. It 2010 Citizens United decision overrules McCain-Feingold limits on corporate political contributions, giving business interests a greater opportunity to influence policy. Social conservatives are hoping that the court’s next term will overturn a right to same sex marriage established by the 2015 Obergefell decision.

Next week I will look at the conflicting priorities in textualist/originalist analysis and how its methodology differs from the more traditional analysis that focuses on the purpose of a law.

///////////////////

Photo by Jim Strasma on Unsplash

Keywords: civil rights, environmentalism, amendments, Bill of Rights, Supreme Court, textualism, originalism

Epstein, Richard Allen. (2014). The classical liberal constitution: The uncertain quest for limited government. Harvard University Press.

Eyer, K. R. (2022). Disentangling textualism and originalism. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4090893

Klarman, M. J. (2016). The Framers’ Coup: The Making of the United States Constitution. Oxford University Press.

Kraft, Michael E. 2022. Environmental Policy and Politics. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.

Smith, Kimberly. 2022. “Environmental Policy In the Courts.” In Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-First Century, eds. Norman J. Vig, Michael E. Kraft, and Barry George Rabe. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. essay, 137–54.