Category: debt GDP ratio

The Conflict in Policy

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March 10, 2024

by Stephen Stofka

This week’s letter continues my analysis of the many roles of the federal government, comparing spending, tax revenues and the federal debt that has accumulated since 9-11. Governments accumulate debt by spending more than they collect in tax revenues. Farmers, businesses and households appreciate the subsidies and support from government but resist paying the taxes to fund those programs. The private marketplace depends on government funding of nascent technologies that may take decades to commercialize. Examples include the internet, the development of semiconductors, lithium batteries and the funding of pharmaceutical research. Investment in military readiness has spurred advancements in aerospace and satellite technology, the GPS that connects our phones and the Kevlar clothing that protects our soldiers and police officers. Critics may ridicule a government investment in solar manufacturer Solyndra, but it was also heavy government funding that provided the cash flow for SpaceX and Tesla.

In last week’s letter I showed that private investment and government spending and investment both averaged about 18% of GDP over the past three decades. A closer look at those two series shows how they complement and compete with each other. In the graph below, private investment dipped from 19% of GDP in 2006 to below 14% in 2009. As a percent of GDP, government spending and investment took up some of the slack.

As many people lost their jobs, they became eligible for Medicaid or food stamps. Both of these programs are included in government spending because the programs directly or indirectly provide people with goods or services. The graph above does not include increased unemployment insurance payments during the recession. These are included in government transfers since this is money, not services, transferred from the government to individuals. Policymakers refer to this combination of support programs as automatic stabilizers, providing assistance to households during hard economic times.

A recent analysis by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) found that these automatic stabilizers were not “key drivers of debt over the long-term.” The federal debt was growing because government spending was increasing at a faster pace than revenues. The chart below shows spending and revenues for the past thirty years in a natural log form to portray the trends of change more clearly.

For most of the past three decades, revenue growth, the orange dashed line in the graph above, lagged government spending, the blue line. Note that this revenue series (FRED Series FYFR) does not include Social Security taxes. The growth in government spending showed some moderation only during Obama’s term and that was the worst time to slow the growth of government spending and investment. The Great Recession of 2007-2009 was the worst economic downturn since the 1930s Depression, surpassing the pain of the back-to-back recessions of the early 1980s.

Biden was vice-President during that recovery and was determined not to repeat that mistake in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Although the Democratic majorities in the House and Senate were slim, unified government helped the effort to pass the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS Act. Both pieces of legislation committed government funds to support investment in clean energy development and semiconductor manufacturing. Such commitment spurred private investment in the energy industry. In 2023 field production of crude oil surpassed 2019 levels, according to the Energy Information Administration (EIA). They report that natural gas output was up 2% in the first year of Biden’s term, then accelerated to 5% growth in 2022 and 2023 following Russia’s attack on Ukraine.

Despite big increases in the deficit after 9-11, and an accumulated debt of $22 trillion held by the public, the interest share of GDP has remained below the levels of the 1990s. In 2001, China was admitted into the World Trade Organization. As imports from China increased, we paid for them with U.S. Treasury debt, helping to keep interest rates low for most of the past two decades.

Unlike individuals and corporations, governments can buy their own debt. Unless a majority of that debt is sold in the private marketplace, there is no independent evaluation of the creditworthiness of that debt. At the end of last year, 65% of the total Federal debt was privately held, the highest percentage since 1997 (see notes). Including the Treasuries held by independent Federal Reserve banks, the percentage is close to 80%. A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) calculates the percentage of debt held by two of our largest trading partners, China and Japan, at 5.8%. The wide ownership of U.S. debt validates it as a low-risk financial instrument.

The global financial system depends on tradeable sound securities. When the financial crisis undermined confidence in mortgage securities, private investment declined sharply, and it would do so again if investors doubted the soundness of Treasury securities. The recent CBO report points out a weakness in public policy that the Congress must resolve or risk damaging the credit of U.S. securities. 1997 was the last year when Congress submitted a budget by the deadline, according to the Congressional Research Service. When is the moment when the private debt market loses hope that Congress can match its spending and revenues? No one can forecast a stampede to safety but in hindsight many will claim to have seen the exit signs.

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Photo by Manki Kim on Unsplash

Keywords: investment, debt, interest, Treasuries, government spending, taxes, automatic stabilizers

According the March 2024 Treasury bulletin, total Federal debt was $34 trillion. $21.7 trillion was privately held – about 65%. See Table OFS-2 of the March bulletin. Privately held debt plus $5.2 trillion of Treasuries held by independent Federal Reserve banks constitute Federal Debt Held by the Public (FRED Series FYGFDPUN) and is close to 80% of total federal debt. For a thirty-year series of the public’s portion of total debt, see https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=1hYFV. Until the 2008 financial crisis Federal Reserve banks held less than 10% of total debt. During the pandemic, that share rose to 21%. At the end of 2023, the share was 15.4%.

Different Rules

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May 2, 2021

by Steve Stofka

This past week President Biden presented some details of the American Family Plan to Congress (WH, 2021). The goal of the proposals is to restore some equity in our economic and political system. Some ask whether the estimated cost of $1.8 trillion is too much. The Federal debt just crossed above the 100% line of debt to GDP. Will the debt cause global investors to demand higher interest for loaning the U.S. money? Will the higher government spending lead to higher inflation? Could a U.S. default on debt payments and interest provoke a global financial crisis even worse than the one in 2008?

How worried are investment managers around the world who hold and manage trillions of US debt? When debt holders are worried about default, they want a higher risk premium, a higher return or interest rate on the debt they hold. When foreign investors are worried that the dollar will significantly depreciate in the next four to five years, a medium term, they want higher interest to compensate for the depreciation of the dollar. When we compare international interest rates in the medium term, we don’t see worry reflected in higher interest rates. We see that the rest of the world is treating U.S. debt as though it were cash.

A mix of interest rates for U.S. debt is 1.61% (UST, 2021). Around the world, Germany’s debt is considered a benchmark of safety because the country has a strong credit rating and is a prudent manager of their finances and economy. Germany’s interest rate mix is a negative .36% (FRED, 2021. Details on the data series are in the footnotes at the end of this blog). The difference between those two rates indicates how much foreign holders expect the U.S. currency to depreciate over several years – about ½% per year. Unlike Germany, the U.S. has total control of monetary policy so that is worth at least ½% annually in risk premium. The real interest rate on the U.S. debt is about 0%, the same rate as cash. How much U.S. debt does the rest of the world hold?

The Congressional Budget Office estimated that the rest of the world owned 40% of all U.S. publicly held debt at the end of 2019 (CBO, 2020). That percentage has probably changed since the pandemic, but I’ll use that as a proxy for the percent of the currently held public debt of $21.6T. Given that percentage estimate, money managers around the world own $8.6 trillion of US debt at an effective average real interest rate of 0%. Why would they do that? A large part of U.S. debt is being used as an effective currency.

The percent of circulating currency in the U.S. to GDP is almost 10%. Remember that currency is a liability of the government that issues the currency. If US Debt held by the rest of the world is $8.6T, then it is about 12.7% of an estimated $68T in rest-of-the-world GDP. The Fed is often accused of “printing money.” We could replace $8.6 trillion of all foreign held debt with cash and the liability would shift from the U.S. Treasury’s balance sheet to the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet. Since the Federal Reserve is also an agency of the U.S. government, it is like moving an I.O.U. from the left pocket to the right pocket. Why are the rules different for the U.S.?

It is the leading economic power and, since WW2, the global financial leader. As the leader, the U.S. is responsible for a global medium of exchange. When Britain was the world’s financial leader the pound and British debt was used as cash around the world. Isn’t gold or silver supposed to be that global currency?

The world has never formally adopted a gold standard. After the war of 1870, European nations agreed to a gold standard in the hopes that this dependent interconnection would prevent another world war. It didn’t. Countries cheat when they want to go to war. Despite the gold standard, Britain’s pound and her debt was the dominant currency around the world. Consols, a perpetual bond that never came due, were first issued by Britain in the 18th century. They were finally retired a few years ago. Anything that will reliably hold an agreed upon value will do as a currency, including debt.

What would happen if the U.S. defaulted on its debt tomorrow? History provides a guide. After WW2, Britain’s debt held by foreigners was about 1/3 of its GDP. It’s economy crippled by the war, that debt was forgiven. The world kept on turning and the U.S., its primary debtor, became the dominant economic power and financial leader. The U.S. debt held by foreigners is currently 39% of GDP, a bit more than Britain’s was after WW2. Should the U.S. default or be unable to pay its interest, China, the largest U.S. creditor, would probably become the financial leader.

The debt of the U.S. has not been paid off since 1835. On the books are remnants of debts from past wars, international and domestic. They include Civil War debts, expenses from WW1 and WW2. Once the U.S. became the financial leader, it was expected to foot the bill for global stability just as Britain had done for 150 years. The U.S. debt includes the war debts of Britain, France and Germany, and partial forgiveness of bond debt from the 1980s crisis in Latin America. It includes war expenses for the Vietnam War and other wars meant to bring global stability. The financial leader of the world carries some of the world’s debt on its books. If China were to take the leadership position, it would assume some of that past debt and become the bearer of those global responsibilities.

Despite its vibrant people, culture and economy, China has an autocratic system of governance. As President Biden noted in his speech this week, Chinese leaders believe that democracy is an outmoded political system. Would I feel comfortable with China as the financial leader? No. I’m an American who has known only the U.S. dollar as the dominant world currency. I have lived in British countries where the people were not comfortable with U.S. leadership. Americans are used to U.S. dominance. Others see only the privileges of being the financial leader and regard the American attitude as arrogance. With that privilege comes extraordinary responsibility and expense. The rules are different.

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Photo by Sharon McCutcheon on Unsplash

CBO. (2020, March). Federal debt: A primer. Retrieved May 01, 2021, from https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56309

U.S. Treasury (UST). (2021, March). Interest rates and prices. Retrieved May 01, 2021, from https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/rates/avg/2021/2021_03.htm

White House (WH). (2021, April 28). Fact sheet: The American Families Plan. Retrieved May 02, 2021, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/04/28/fact-sheet-the-american-families-plan/

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These data series can be view at the Federal Reserve web site, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/

Trade-weighted exchange rate is 112.44 (DTWEXBGS). Germany’s interest rate mix is -.36 (FRED IRLTCT01DEM156N). The percent of circulating currency to U.S. GDP is 9.5% (CURRCIR / GDP *100). Publicly held Federal debt is $21.6 trillion (FYGFDPUN).

Finding the Right Wires

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February 14, 2021

by Steve Stofka

Since WW2, households have traditionally held more debt than the federal government as a percent of GDP. I’ll call it %Debt. The biggest component of household debt is mortgages, and includes car loans, student loans, credit card debt, etc. A decade ago, Federal %Debt surpassed households, effectively allowing households to reduce their debt level and put it on the federal balance sheet.

Federal debt spiked during the pandemic while household debt levels have risen only 1.5%. For decades, deficit hawks have long warned that rising federal debt levels could cause an economic implosion that would make the Great Depression look tame by comparison. They may be right – finally.

There are two ways that the federal %Debt can go down. The first is to grow the economy; that’s the GDP in the denominator of Debt / GDP. The second way is to reduce the level of Debt, the numerator. It is unlikely that Congress is going to raise taxes enough to reduce the debt, so that leaves only one way to reduce %Debt – grow the economy faster than the growth in federal debt.

To do that, consumers need to spend money because their spending makes up 70% of GDP. There are three ways to increase spending. The first is to increase incomes faster than economic growth but that has not been happening for several decades. The real growth in middle class incomes over the past 30 years is only 15%, or 1/2% per year average.

The non-partisan Congressional Budget Office projects that total incomes will increase by an average of $33B per year over the next decade if the minimum wage is raised to $15 over the next five years (CBO, 2021). That increase of 1.5% in GDP will not change the federal %Debt by much.

The second way to increase GDP is for consumers to take on more debt. A rise in housing prices has lifted the net worth of many households, who can tap into that equity to increase their spending. However, households are already choked with debt. The two largest generations, the Millennials and the Boomers are offsetting each other’s spending. Older Boomers are reducing spending as Millennials increase their purchases. The Millennials have been crushed by the financial crisis a decade ago and again with the Covid crisis. Many feel like they came along at the wrong time in history and are cautious. When consumers pay down debt, they spend less and that lowers GDP growth.

The third way is probably the trend of the future. The federal government will continue to pile debt on its balance sheet and shift income onto households in the hopes that consumers will spend money and grow the economy faster than the rise in federal debt. There is a concept called the multiplier and economists argue over its value. It is the total effect of spending in an economy when the government spends $1. That depends on consumer and business confidence, which depends on the amount of debt each sector holds. The IMF estimates that the multiplier is about 1.5, so that $1 of spending equals $1.50. If so, deficit spending might grow the economy faster than the federal debt grows.

I’ll return to a proposal I discarded earlier – increasing taxes, particularly on the top 10% who don’t spend as much of their incomes on consumer goods as the bottom 90%. Under the Budget Reconciliation rule in the Senate, the Democrats could pass tax legislation that undoes the 2017 tax cuts that the Republicans passed using that reconciliation process. In his campaign proposals, President Biden limited any tax increases to those making $400,000 or more, a small sliver of the population.

Income distribution is skewed toward the upper 5%, who will fight vigorously to keep what they have. They will complain – and they have a point – that they are already paying higher taxes in the form of lost income because interest rates are so low. Those with savings are being paid a paltry amount in interest but the low rates reduce the interest on the debt that the federal government pays each year. Boomers on fixed incomes are having to reduce their savings faster  to meet monthly expenses.

The structure of income distribution is weak. No, it’s not a problem with capitalism, as some like to claim. This is a problem with political policy which pre-dates capitalism. A small group of people in a nation take command of the distribution levers and direct more of the nation’s income to themselves. In the 1700s, the problem was thought to originate with monarchy and aristocracy. Democracy was going to cure the problem, but it didn’t. Communism was going to cure the problem and it didn’t. Socialism – the middle way between capitalism and communism – was going to solve the problem, but the EU demonstrates that socialism simply slows growth, increases structural unemployment, and does little to solve the persistent problem of distributional inequalities.

Governments worry about exogenous factors like Covid, war, or a dramatic shift in commodity prices. While those do produce crises, they do so because of endogenous factors – weaknesses in a nation’s political and economic system that award property rights in such a way as to exacerbate social tensions. The Great Depression and Financial Crisis were examples.

Since the Financial Crisis a decade ago, people in nations around the world have been raising their fists and their voices. The productivity gains that capitalism promoted had ameliorated the centuries old problem of political oligarchies, but no economic system can solve what is fundamentally a political problem.

Those who voted for former President Trump in 2016 did so thinking that he was a political outsider who could “drain the swamp,” i.e., bust up the political oligarchy that controls Washington. He became part of that oligarchy, feeding the monster, because it relied on his lack of political expertise.

Those who voted for President Biden hope that his decency and moderation will help craft legislation that unlooses the grip that the oligarchy has on our political process. Which wires do we pull to disconnect the oligarchy?

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Photo by Victor Barrios on Unsplash

Congressional Budget Office (CBO). (2021, February 08). The budgetary effects of the raise the Wage act of 2021. Retrieved February 13, 2021, from https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56975

Tax Policy Center. (2020, May). What is reconciliation? Retrieved February 13, 2021, from https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-reconciliation

The Madness of Methodology

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April 28th, 2013

A fight between economists is not as exciting as a dinosaur smackdown (Jurassic Park), but the controversy can be as damaging.  Politicians and pundits love to trot out those economic studies and theories which justify their actions or political point of view.  In 2009, two economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (now affectionately known as RR), published a study which showed that a country’s GDP growth becomes slightly negative when its debt grows above 90% of its GDP.  The study was cited by many politicians and pundits in Europe and the US, including VP candidate Paul Ryan, as they proposed various forms of austerity to curb the explosive growth of national debt.

Here’s what the debt to GDP ratio looked like 1940 – 1960

In the years 1947 – 1959, we had an annualized growth rate of 3.6% but a strong component of this growth was our strategic advantage in exports, being the manufacturing capital of the world after much of the production capacity of the developed world was destroyed in WW2.

Here’s what it looks like now; the same spike of debt.

But we have lost the advantage of being the leading manufacturer.

Given the assignment of replicating an existing economic study, Thomas Herndon, a PhD candidate at UMass, discovered some glaring spreadsheet errors in the original data set compiled by RR.  You can read an Alternet article summarizing the details here.

Some quick background.  There are two categories of economic policies.  Fiscal policy encompasses taxing and spending measures by a government.  Monetary policy is conducted by a country’s central bank and are targeted at the supply of money and interest rates.  Economists argue over which policy is more effective in a given circumstance.  Each of us goes about our daily lives under the influence of both fiscal and monetary policy. 

During the 1930s depression, the economist John Maynard Keynes proposed that governments borrow and spend money during recessions to make up for the lack of aggregate demand in the economy.  After the economy recovered, governments would then raise taxes to pay back the borrowed money.  Another leading economist, James Buchanan, predicted that nations who followed Keynes’ ideas would have permanent deficits.  While Keynes’ economic model was elegant, Buchanan argued that there was no incentive for a politician to raise taxes.

In 1963, with the publication of A Monetary History of the U.S., economists Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued that the Depression had been largely a result of failed monetary policy by central banks.  During the 1970s, when government fiscal policies of increasing intervention in the economy failed to ingnite growth or curb inflation, Keynes’ policies fell into disfavor. 

The age old debate about the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy never dies. The recession that began in 2008 revived Keynes’ ideas.  In the late 1990s and early 2000s, economist Paul Krugman and Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke were proponents of monetary solutions for Japan’s moribund economy.  As the world economy imploded in 2008, both men changed course and became advocates for fiscal policy as the most effective solution for the country’s economic woes.

In a recently published paper UMass professors Michael Ash and Robert Pollin (Herndon’s advisors), explained their methodology and took RR to task for their lack of follow up on incomplete data analysis after several years.  What they had missed was a follow up paper by RR in February 2011 and another published in the summer of 2012.  In these papers, RR modified their initial findings, saying that GDP growth slowed but did not necessarily turn negative.

In a WSJ blog post , RR answered the critique from the UMass Professors.  They admitted their spreadsheet error but reaffirmed their other assumptions in the study and their amended conclusions.

Paul Krugman weighed in (or waded in?), voicing his disappointment with RR’s methodology and their conclusion.  Krugman does make a point oft repeated in the social studies: correlation is not causation.  Does high debt cause slow GDP growth?  Or, does slow GDP growth cause high debt?  Or can we say that there is some indication that they accompany each other?

At Econbrowser, U. Cal professor James Hamilton, reviewed RR’s methodology and Ash and Pollin’s critique. (Link)  To which, Professors Ash and Pollin responded with some good points.

Ash and Pollin have made the original data available.  Some have accused RR of purposefully leaving five countries out of their data, saying that these five countries would have weakened or invalidated their findings.  The Excel file shows that this was a simple – but dumb – mistake, not some nefarious plan by RR.  The countries left out are on the last five worksheets which are arranged in alphabetical order.  What surprises many is that two prominent economists could publish a paper based on work that had so little verification before publication. 

What I question is RR’s decision to include many of the smaller countries at all in their analysis.  Finland and Ireland each have less than 2% of the GDP of the U.S. 

What I do hope is that this controversy will spur more analysis of the relationship between a nation’s debt load and its economic growth.  What I am afraid of is that this will discourage researchers from sharing their working data.  Reinhart and Rogoff are to be highly commended for doing so.