Inflation and Profit Flow

September 18, 2022

by Stephen Stofka

Price records circumstances, not value or utility. Our buying power is like a bar of soap. As water shrinks soap, high inflation shrinks our buying power. Economists offer several explanations for the persistent inflation but the one that I buy is that constrained supply and fairly steady demand are driving prices higher. Rising prices are a symptom of a shortage of goods – a quantity issue. Retailers inventory to sales ratio has increased slightly from the historic low in May 2021 but the ratio is still far below the range of 1.4 – 1.5 that was the benchmark before the pandemic.

This past Thursday, I picked up three jars of my favorite crunchy peanut butter. Some stores have been out of stock on the crunchy variety so I bought extra to be sure. I was not concerned about rising prices. I was responding to a quantity shortage, or the fear of a shortage. The difference is important. In Econ 101, students are shown the standard supply and demand diagram.

Left out of this stylized relationship is that supply is on a slower time scale than demand. It takes time, planning, investment and risk to produce all that supply. To cope with that reality, businesses must keep an inventory on hand to meet changes in demand which happen on a shorter time scale. Shift the red supply line to the left and the intersection of supply and demand occurs at a higher price. The Fed and the market thought that the supply constraints would fully resolve by this year but they have not. As stores and restaurants reopened, customers put away the electric panini sandwich makers, bread machines and gym equipment they had bought during the pandemic. They began purchasing consumables and were willing to pay higher prices for clothes, airline and movie tickets, and restaurant meals. In the face of ongoing supply constraints, the Fed has had to keep raising interest rates to try to curb demand, shifting the blue demand line to the left as well.

The higher prices helped businesses recover profits lost during the pandemic. Businesses have taken advantage of the supply disruptions to juice their profits by 33% (BEA, 2022).

When the Republicans took control of both chambers of Congress and the Presidency, they lowered corporate taxes. Those on the left often blame the economic elite for society’s problems and wasted no opportunity in criticizing Republicans for gifting the corporate elite. Mr. Trump boasted on his business prowess, promising to get the economy revving up again. Despite his rhetoric, corporate profits remained at the same level as during Mr. Obama’s second term.

A Presidential veto can block legislation but it is Congress that passes the laws that affect the economy. As I wrote last week Congress sometimes buys voter approval, creating bubbles that finally implode. The State Historical Society of Iowa (2019) has an image of a 1928 campaign ad for Herbert Hoover. It is a resume of economic progress under total Republican control during the 1920s. The Congress had won the public’s approval with easy credit and lax regulation. The following year the onset of the Great Depression brought down the house of cards. 25% of workers lost their jobs. Many lost their homes and farms.

Corporations exist to turn money flows into profits. Whatever money Congress spends winds up in corporate coffers. After 9-11, the federal public debt rose by $3 trillion (U.S. Treasury Dept, 2019) while corporate profits more than doubled, all thanks to Congress. Democrats and Republicans supported higher military spending and a building boom supported by easy credit policies.

In response to the pandemic, a bipartisan effort in Congress passed relief packages of more than $3 trillion. Today the public debt is $7 trillion above the pre-pandemic level. Much of that money became corporate profit because that’s what good companies do – turn cash flows into profits. Some of those profits were then used to buy the Treasury bills generated when the government increased their debt. This completed the cycle of debt and profits.

On average voters re-elect 90% of House members and 80% of Senate members. Midterm elections are less than two months away. Both parties take advantage of the public’s tendency to pin responsibility – good or bad – on the President, both the current and the past President, Mr. Trump. “Inflation is Biden’s fault,” Republicans will say and hope it sticks with some voters. Democrats hope that Trump will announce a 2024 run for President before the coming midterm election. They hope that independent voters, particularly suburban women, will vote for Democrats to voice their disaffection with Mr. Trump.

The election spending will juice the profits of media companies who depend on the craziness of our democratic politics. People in western European countries look in dismay at our frenzied politics that makes us vulnerable to a populist like Trump. Some Americans long for authoritarian measures that might curb the craziness of our politics and promote more cooperation. They are tired of the demolition derby of American democracy and wish they could go to sleep for a few months until it is over.

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Photo by Anvesh Uppunuthula on Unsplash

State Historical Society of Iowa. (2019, January 14). “A chicken for every pot” political ad, October 30, 1928. IDCA. Retrieved September 16, 2022, from https://iowaculture.gov/history/education/educator-resources/primary-source-sets/great-depression-and-herbert-hoover/chicken If you have a moment, do check this out!

BEA: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Corporate Profits After Tax (without IVA and CCAdj) [CP], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CP, September 16, 2022.

U.S. Department of the Treasury. Fiscal Service, Federal Debt: Total Public Debt [GFDEBTN], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEBTN, September 16, 2022.

The Erosion of Inflation

August 13, 2016

What is inflation?  Commonly regarded as the change in prices from one year to the next, we can also define it as the rate at which the value of money declines.  In classical monetary theory, inflation reflects government demand for private savings.  When savings can not meet the demand, immoderate governments create the money they need.  This influx of invented money leads to higher prices and inflation.

Higher inflation encourages borrowers, including governments, since they can pay back loans borrowed in Year 1 with money that is worth less in Year 2.  A person who borrows $100 for a year at 10% interest but with 10% inflation, pays back a total of $110.  But the $110 is only worth 90%, or $99, in purchasing power.  In effect, the lender has paid the borrower for loaning the borrower money.  In a case like this, no one wants to lend money at that interest rate. The lender must charge a higher interest rate, driving up the price of borrowed money in a self-reinforcing tailspin of inflation chasing interest rates chasing inflation.

Deflation, or negative inflation, discourages borrowing for the opposite reason; money borrowed in Year 1 is paid back with money that is worth more in Year 2.  That same $100 borrowed for a year at 10% interest and 10% de-flation is paid back with $110 that now has the purchasing power of $121.  In this example, the borrower effectively pays the lender 21% interest.

I marked up a graph of post-1850 inflation I found here to show several key points in the “hockey stick” of inflation.

The Federal Government borrowed and spent a great deal of money during the Civil War period 1860-65, driving up the rate of inflation.   With a  currency backed by gold and sometimes silver, it took several decades of intermittent deflationary periods to correct for the imbalance of the Civil War.

When the Federal Reserve was created in 1913, the value of a dollar was little changed since 1850.  The Bureau of Labor Statistics doesn’t compile data on inflation before 1913.  After a World War and a severe short recession, a dollar in 1920 was worth half of what it was in  1913 {BLS }

Several years of deflation after the stock market crash restored some of the value to the dollar until the Federal Government began borrowing large sums of money to fund Roosevelt’s New Deal.  Inflation accelerated under the heavy government borrowing for World War 2.

Even though Roosevelt had ended the ready convertibility of dollars to gold during the Depression, several countries wanted cooperation in setting an international monetary standard.  At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, a year before the end of World War 2, the price of gold was fixed at $35 per ounce, a dollar benchmark that effectively made the U.S. dollar the world’s reserve currency.
In 1971, the Nixon administration removed that fixed price and allowed the dollar to float in price against gold and other currencies.  Within two years, the rest of the developed world followed suit.  A glance at the chart shows that this is the bend in the hockey stick, the point where cumulative inflation marches relentlessly upwards.

As I noted at the start, some inflation encourages borrowing. The keyword is “some.”  High inflation introduces so much uncertainty into the economy that it becomes debilitating.  Workers can not negotiate wage increases fast enough to keep up with the speed of inflation,, so they reduce their real spending.  Lenders demand high interest rates when they lend money in order to compensate for the declining value of money.  The high rates discourage borrowing and crimp economic activity.

A reasonable and fairly predictable inflation rate allows debt burdened governments to pay back borrowed money with money that has less value. In half a lifetime, from the point in 1973 when most governments freed their currency from a gold standard, the U.S. dollar has lost 80% of its value.  For the first two decades of these past forty years, family income kept pace with that loss of value.  During the last two decades the value of a family’s labor has been transferred to governments whose elected officials devise programs to return some of that transferred value to the most disadvantaged families.

In real terms, personal incomes have more than tripled since 1973 {Graph} but most of those gains were in the twenty-five years ending in 2000 when real personal incomes grew by 135%, a 5% annual pace.  In the sixteen years since 2000, real incomes have risen only 35%, averaging slightly above 2% per year.  When the value of money declines, the only way to save value is to invest money in assets, and only those on the upper half of the income scale have been able to preserve the value of their money in assets.  The lower half on that income scale has struggled.

As the value of money has declined in the past forty years, money invested in assets have gained in value. The press goes goo-goo as the SP500 makes new highs but that is a nominal value.  The inflation adjusted value is barely above its value in 2000 (Table) but has tripled in real value since 1973.  Home prices have not done as well but have gained 50% since 1975 (Graph).  For many families, their house is the majority of their assets and the inflation adjusted Case Shiller home price index is still below the level of ten years ago.

Elections are a competition of ideas for solutions and this election is no different.  The chief theme has been the ever declining value of money and labor, the relentless struggle of those on the lower half of the income scale. Folks on the political left favor ever more government intervention and clamor for more social programs to reduce household expenses, including free college tuition,  childcare and medical care. On the income side, the left calls for a doubling of the minimum wage.  Higher taxes and more debt will pay for these solutions.

Folks on the right side of the political aisle are ruled by an ideology that opposes government solutions, believing that there always exist remedies from the private sector even if there are no proposals for a private solution.  However, even those on the right want more government spending, but of the military kind, where it can most benefit families and economies in rural communities.  Donald Trump is now calling for greater infrastructure spending but this is sure to anger the conservatives in his party.  Folks on the right claim that more spending will be paid for by lower taxes on upper income families and the magic of wishful thinking called optimistic economic assumptions and dynamic budget scoring

For more than four decades, the world has been engaged in an international game of currency manipulation to prevent the fair market pricing of each country’s currency. Nations newly industrializing disregarded or gave a knowing wink to international agreements on labor practices and environmental protections.  Now the populations of the developed countries are aging and their birth rates are falling, particularly those countries in western Europe.  Already high government debt levels are strained by a swell of retiring workers who want the pension benefits they have been promised.  Economic growth that is sluggish or non-existent can not meet the demands for services and benefits, prompting more government borrowing.

Promises in a Presidential campaign are like unicorns.  After the election, the candidate removes the horn and voters realize that what they got was a rather good looking but ordinary horse, not a magical unicorn.  Promises are nevertheless calling cards to a political vision, and the vision of both campaigns is a rally ’round the flag of the domestic economy and American families. Trump’s supporters are endorsing his call for tariffs on imported goods to punish those countries which subsidize their industries and make American products less competitive in price.  Hillary Clinton is now calling for penalties for company inversions, the practice of relocating the legal presence of a business overseas to lower a company’s tax liability.  To rally their troops each candidate promises to fight the international system that threatens the well being of many American families.  However, it is our own government that is part of that system, the war on the value of money, on the value of work.

Still Worried

November 1, 2015

Today is the day that U.S. readers fall back.  Let’s hope it’s the only thing that falls back!

Eight years ago, in October 2007, the SP500 index reached a pre-recession high of 1550. After this month’s 8% recovery the index stands at 2079, more than a third above that long ago high.  A decade long chart of the SP500 shows the inflection points of sentiment.  We can compare two averages to understand the shifts in investor confidence.  A three month average, one quarter of a year, captures short term concerns and hesitations.  A one year average reflects doubts or optimisms that have strengthened over time.  The crossing of one average above or below the other gives us a signal that a change may be coming.  Concerns may be temporary – or not.

After falling below the 12 month average, the 3 month average strained and groaned to pull its chin above that long average, notching five consecutive weekly gains.  Both China and the EU central banks have announced plans for lower interest rates or QE to spur their economies.  Oil prices continued to bounce around under the $50 mark.  OPEC suppliers announced they could not agree on production cuts.  Fearing a continuing oversupply of crude, oil prices fell 4 – 5%.  Then came the news that the number of oil rigs in the U.S. had fallen.  Prices went back up.

Commodities and mining stocks remain under pressure.  After falling over 18% in September, mining stocks gained back most of those losses in the first two weeks of October, then fell back in the last half of this month, closing the month with a 3% gain.  15 to 20% gains and losses in a sector during a month looks like so much scurrying and confusion.

Emerging market indexes lost ground this past week, slipping more than 4%.  Worries of a global recession continue to haunt various markets.  For large and medium U.S. companies, a slowdown in European and Asian markets is sure to have a negative effect on the bottom line.

The first estimate of 3rd quarter GDP growth was a paltry 1.5%, far below the 3.9% annual rate of the 2nd quarter.  Two-thirds of the SP500 companies have reported earnings for the 3rd quarter and FactSet estimates a decline of 2.2% for the quarter, the second consecutive quarter of earnings declines.

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The Causes of Depression

The economic kind, not the emotional and psychological variety.  Economics history buffs will enjoy David Stockman’s critique of the extraordinary amount of monetary easing under former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke.  As President Reagan’s budget director, Stockman was at the forefront of supply side economics, a theory which promised an answer to the stagflation of the 1970s that drove many to question the assumptions and conclusions of Keynesian economics.

At first a champion of this new approach to economic policy making, Stockman grew disillusioned and later coined the term “voodoo economics” to describe the contradictory thinking of his boss and others in the Republican Party who stuck by their beliefs in supply side economics in spite of the evidence that these policies generated large budget deficits and erratic economic cycles.

In 2010, Stockman penned an editorial  that held some in the Republican Party, his party, culpable for the 2008 fiscal crisis.  He understands that politicians and policy makers become welded to their ideological platforms, disregarding any input that might upset their model of the world.

For those who have a bit of time, an Atlantic magazine December 1981 an article acquainted readers with David Stockman in his first year as budget director.  The budget process seems as broken today as it was 35 years ago when Stockman assumed the task of constructing a Federal budget.

 These “internal mysteries” of the budget process were not dwelt upon by either side, for there was no point in confusing the clear lines of political debate with a much deeper and unanswerable question: Does anyone truly understand, much less control, the dynamics of the federal budget intertwined with the mysteries of the national economy?

Stockman understands the political gamesmanship that permeates Washington.  He criticizes Bernanke’s analysis of the 2008 Great Recession as well as the 1930s Great Depression. Faulty analysis produces faulty remedies. Stockman goes still further, finding fault with Milton Friedman’s monetary analysis of the causes of the Great Depression.  In a 1963 study titled A Monetary History of the United States Friedman and co-author Anna Schwartz found that monetary actions by the Federal Reserve deepened and lengthened the 1930s Depression.  Friedman became the leading spokesman of monetarism in the late 20th century, the thinking that governments can more effectively guide a national economy by adjusting the money supply rather than employing an ever changing regime of fiscal policies.

Students of the great debate of the past 100 years – bottom up or top down? – will enjoy Stockman’s take on the matter.

The Long Run

Now the really big picture.  Reflecting the severity of the market downturn that began in late 2007, the 4 year average (50 month) of the S&P500 index is getting close to crossing below the 17 year (200 month) average.  Remember, this is years.  In the normal course of affairs, inflation tends to keep the shorter average above the longer average.  The crossing or “nearing” of these two averages reveals just how sick the past decade has been.  The last time the market showed this indicator of prolonged market weakness was in the first half of 1978, after a 43% market drop in the bear market of 1973-74 and a 19% drop in 1977.

In the last 60 years, was the October 2008 market drop of 17% the deepest monthly plunge in equity prices?  No, that honor goes to the almost 22% dive in October 1987.  For a consecutive 3 month drop, 2008 does barely nudge out 1987, both falling 30%.

Although headlines will speak of the downturn in the Fall of 2008 as the worst since the depression, it is important for Boomers to remember that our parents’ generation suffered through some pretty severe market declines as well.  In 1987, most Boomers were in their thirties and probably had relatively few dollars in the stock market.  We may remember “Black Monday”, October 19, 1987, for the headlines but it was not as personal as the 2008 decline because we were decades before retirement and had less at stake.  What particularly distinguishes the two years is that the unemployment rate continued to fall during the 1987 decline.

Young people don’t remember market crashes the way that older people do.  When we are young, we have – like forever – before we are going to be old.  For the echo boomer generation born in the eighties and nineties, also known as the  “millennials”, or Generation Y, the crash of 2008 will be a faint or non-existent memory when they reach their fifties decades from now.  They will probably get to have their own crash – one that they will remember because they will have more at stake.

When we are in our twenties, someone should prepare us.  We are going to work hard and save money.  We are probably going to put some of that hard earned money in the stock market.  Then, when we are in our fifties, sixties or seventies, we are going to flip out when our stock portfolio drops by 40%.  Would we listen to or remember that sage advice?  Probably not.

Depression

Harold L. Cole and Lee E. Ohanian, two economics professors, relate some employment numbers during the 1930s depression in a Feb. 2nd, 2009 op-ed in the WSJ “How Gov’t Prolonged the Depression.”

“Total hours worked per adult, including government employees, were 18% below their 1929 level between 1930-32, but were 23% lower on average during the New Deal (1933-39). Private hours worked were even lower after FDR took office, averaging 27% below their 1929 level, compared to 18% lower between 1930-32.” They ask why there wasn’t a vigorous recovery, noting that “Productivity grew very rapidly after 1933, the price level was stable, real interest rates were low, and liquidity was plentiful.”

They acknowledge the benefits of a “basic social safety net through Social Security and unemployment benefits, and by stabilizing the financial system through deposit insurance and Securities Exchange Commission.” But those benefits were offset by “suppressing competition, and setting prices and wages in many sectors well above their normal levels.” These latter policies “choked off powerful recovery forces that would have plausibly returned the economy back to trend by the mid-1930s”.

These recovery forces included expansionary [see my note at the end of this blog entry] Federal Reserve policy and productivity growth. They note that the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) voided existing antitrust laws and “permitted industries to collusively raise prices” as long as they paid their workers above average wages, in effect, gaming the system. The NIRA codes detailed conduct for 500 industries that were designed to eliminate “excessive competition”, which Roosevelt believed to be the cause of the depression. “These codes distorted the economy by artificially raising wages and prices, restricting output, and reducing productive capacity by placing quotas on industry investment in new plants and equipment.” NIRA was declared unconstitutional in 1935 but the practices continued.

At the end of 1938, with the reversal of some of these New Deal policies, the economy began to recover. The main lesson to be learned, the writers contend, from the policies of the 1930s and price controls introduced in the 1970s, is that government intervention on a large scale can have unintended consequences. The professors call for reforms including updated bank regulations, tax changes that “broaden rather than narrow the tax base”, as well as savings and investment incentives.

A person reading Milton Friedman’s analysis of Federal Reserve policy during the depression years would hardly call that policy “expansionary”, as these two authors do. Here is a more detailed telling of the Federal Reserve’s role in the depression. There is also a book of essays by the current Fed chairman, Ben Bernanke.