Category: business loans

The Hunt, Part 2

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July 22, 2018

by Steve Stofka

Last week, I showed the inputs to the credit constrained economy as a percent of GDP. I’ll put that up again here.

CreditGrowthFedSpendPctGDP

This week I’ll add in the drains but first let me review one of the inputs, bank loans. Focus your attention on that period just after 9/11, the left gray recession bar,  and the end of 2006, just to the left of the red box outlining the Great Recession on the right.  For those five years after 9/11, the banks doubled their loans to state and local governments, a surge of $1.4 trillion. The banks increased their household and mortgage lending by $5.3 trillion, or 67%. Why did banks act so foolishly? Former Fed chairman Alan Greenspan couldn’t answer that. We have a partial clue.

For 4-1/2 years after 9/11 and the dot-com bust, there was no growth in credit to businesses, a phenomenon unseen before in the data history since WW2. The banks reached out to households, as well as state and local governments because they needed the $1 trillion in loan business missing on the corporate side (#1 below).

There are four drains in the economic engine – Federal taxes, payments on loans, bad debts and the change in bank capital. State and local government taxes are not a drain because those government entities can not create credit. The change in bank capital reflects the changes in the banks’ loan leverage and their confidence in the economy. During the 1990s and 2010s the sum of the inputs and the drains remained within a tight range of about 1/7th of GDP.

InputLessDrains

The results of bad policy during the 2000s are shown clearly in the graph. In addition to the surge in bank loans, the Federal government went on a spending spree after 9/11. There was too much input and not enough drain. The reduction in taxes in 2001 and 2003 exacerbated the problem. There was less being drained out. Asset prices absorb policy mistakes until they don’t – a life lesson for all investors.

Let’s add in a second line to the graph – inflation. The rise and fall of inflation approximates the flows of this economic engine model with a lag time of several months. I’ve shown the peaks and troughs in each series.

InputLessDrainsVsPCE

Look at that critical period from 2006 through 2007. The Fed kept raising rates in response to rising inflation (the red line), driven primarily by increases in the price of oil.  The Fed Funds rate peaked out at 5-1/4% in the summer of 2006 and stayed at that level for a year. The Fed misread the longer term inflation trend and contributed to the onset of the recession in late 2007. The net flows in the engine model (blue line) indicated that the long term trend of inflation was down, not up.

Where will inflation go next? Using last week’s theme, follow the hounds! Who are the hounds? The banks. The inflow of credit from the banks is the primary driver of inflation. Why has inflation in the past decade been low? Because credit growth has been low. Where will inflation go next? A gentle increase – see the slight incline of the blue line at the right of the graph. Contributing to that increase were last year’s tax cuts. Less money is being drained out of the engine.

Too much flow into the economic engine or an improper setting of interest rates – these mistakes are absorbed by assets, which are the reservoirs of the engine. Stocks, bonds and homes are the most commonly held assets and most likely to be mispriced. During the early to mid 2000s, the mistakes in input were so drastic that the financial crisis seems inevitable when we look in the rear view mirror. During the past eight years, the inputs and drains have remained steady, but interest rates have been set at an inappropriate level. Again, we can anticipate that asset prices have been absorbing the mistakes in policy.

 

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1. In the last quarter of 2001, loans to non-financial corporate business totaled $2.9 trillion and had averaged 6%+ growth for the past decade. Anticipating that same growth would have implied a credit balance of $3.9 trillion by the end of 2006. The actual balance was $3.1 trillion.

Investment Declines

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September 4, 2016

The market seems awfully quiet leading into September, a month that is the most consistently negative for the past century. LPLResearch notes that it has been about 35 years since the market was this quiet for this long.  It has been 30 trading days (at the end of August) since the SP500 had strayed more than 1% from its 10 day average.  A year ago in August 2015 the market spent 17 trading days in this quiet zone then fell 6% in 3 days. In September 2014, the market acted like a sailing ship in the horse latitudes before sinking 6% over the following ten days.  We wish the market went up after these long quiet periods, but the trend is usually down.

Investment

Let’s look at a disturbing long term trend – a decline in private investment in housing (residential), as well as factories, equipment and office buildings (non-residential).  What is private?  Non-government, i.e. companies and individuals in the private market.

First, let’s look at private investment as a whole before we look at the parts.  As a percent of GDP, we are near post-WW2 lows.

“Oh, that was the housing bubble and financial crisis,” we might say.  Everytime we think we’ve got it figured out, that is the beginning of the journey of learning, some Zen master probably said at some time.  Be humble, little tree frog, or wax on, wax off.  Something like that.

Only this year has the economy surpassed the 2008 level of inflation adjusted private investment.  To get a sense of the damage done by the financial and housing crisis, the chart below is a rolling 5 year sum of investment and covers most of the post-WW2 period.  Look at the historic dip – not a pause, not a flattening, but a genuine crater in investment growth.  Here we can see the over-investment during the tech bubble of the late nineties when the 5 year sum climbed at a 60 degree angle, followed by the 45 degree climb as the housing bubble climaxed. Even scarier is the possibility that we may still be above the growth trend of the 70s, 80s and early 90s – that there is still a bit of correction left.

Housing Investment

Seven years after the official end of the recession, ten years after the height of the housing bubble, investment in residential housing is still near all time lows.  As a percent of the economy (GDP) it has been rising but from a great depth.

Slow household formation after the financial crisis, i.e. Johnny and Mary staying home or moving back in with Mom and Dad, has contributed to the slow recovery in housing investment.  The millennial generation, bigger in numbers than the aging Boomers, doesn’t have the same preference for owning their own home.  Census Bureau data shows that the home ownership rate in the under-35 crowd has declined from 39% in 2010 to 34% in 2016.  While it may be more noticeable in the millennial aged cohort, the data shows a decline in all age groups, and across incomes (page 10).   Competition for a dwindling stock of apartment rentals has caused a sharp rise in median rental rates across the country.

Why a dwindling number of rental units?  As home ownership rose in the 2000s, the investments in new apartment building began to decline in 2007, then fell abruptly during the crisis.  Only in 2011 did it finally start to rise up from its trough.  The drop in investment was so huge that just posting a number doesn’t do it justice.  Millennials are now being squeezed by a lack of rental housing stock.  Sharply rising home values in popular areas like Denver make it more difficult for millennials to shift preferences to home ownership.

The business Side

Now let’s look at investments in office buildings, equipment and factories.  These can be somewhat cyclical but the long term trend is down.  Since China was admitted to the WTO in 2001, the highs in the cycle have been trending lower.  During the 2000s Americans were not saving enough to fund business investment growth and our economy increasingly relied on foreign investment dollars.  Today we are on the decline in that investment cycle and we can expect further declines.

Does low inflation hurt investment?

It makes sense that a stable environment of low inflation should encourage business investment.  Low interest rates should encourage lending to business, etc.  This is the conventional narrative that has guided policy making at the Federal Reserve.  Stop an economist on the street and ask them if low interest rates encourage business investment and they will probably say yes. Here’s a quote from an economics course “If the expected rate of return [on the new investment] is greater than the real interest rate, the investment makes sense.”

Makes sense but what if it is partially wrong? Is it possible that low interest rates could, in some cases, discourage investment?  This is the opposite of the conventional narrative but let’s walk this path for a bit.  We often think of interest rates as a dependent variable, a response to something indicating a demand for money.  What if it is also an independent variable, a cause affecting the demand for money? Yep, it’s one of those interdependent cyclic things that might make you want to meditate on the universality of love and being, but stay with me 🙂

Interest rates can be a heuristic for investors, a signal of the demand for money, a weather vane of the underlying strength of the economy as seen by the top economists in the country, the folks at the Federal Reserve.  Low rates could be seen as a cautionary warning to investors.  If the economy were really getting stronger, would interest rates remain low?  Of course not, an investor might reason.  They would rise in response to stronger demand for money.  But they are not rising so better to be cautious, the investor reasons.  The dog chases its tail.

Do low interest rates cause reckless borrowing?

Are low interest rates prompting companies to borrow excessively?  Well, yes and no.  Yes, they are borrowing more but the growth trajectory, the rate of growth, is about the same as it has been since 1990.  As we can see in the chart below, each recession is a pause in the growth of corporate debt.  After each recession, the level rises again on approximately the same slope.  The “pause” in this last recession lasted a whopping four years, during which corporate debt declined as much as $600 billion, or about 5.6%.

The problem is what they are borrowing it for.  Companies typically buy back their own shares at their hghest, not lowest value.  By lowering the number of shares outstanding, buybacks raise the earnings per share even if there is no real growth in earnings.  Instead of buying low, selling high, companies tend to buy high, sell low. FactSet gathers and crunches a lot of market data.  Their mid-year analysis of share buybacks shows that total dollars spent on buybacks is approaching the highs of 2007.  Investment in real growth, in productive plants, equipment and office buildings, has declined the past three quarters but share buybacks, the appearance of growth, have increased.

A simple example

How could low inflation hurt investment?  If predicted inflation is rather low, about 2%, sales growth will not get that extra kick from inflation. Let’s say that a company’s sales are $1000 and the owners have an extra $50 to invest.  They are considering a plan to invest $50 and borrow $50 from the bank to expand in the hopes of making more sales.

First they consider the return by not expanding.  They put their $50 in the bank and make 2% interest or $1.  At 2% inflation, $1000 sales grows to $1020.  Let’s say that the company has a 30% gross margin, which gives an extra $6 profit on the extra $20 in sales.  The combined extra return to the owners is $7, a $6 profit and $1 in interest income.

Then they consider a second scenario.  Let’s say that the interest rate on the borrowed money is 6%, or 4% above the inflation rate of 2%.  As in the first scenario, they assume that the savings rate, or opportunity cost, of the invested $50 is about 2%.  The owners can expect an extra $4 imputed and actual cost on that combined $100 of investment.  If inflation is averaging 2% per year, then they can expect sales of $1020 even if there is no real sales growth.  Again, they use a 30% gross margin to arrive at an extra profit to them of $6, the same as the first scenario. If the extra investment does not produce any real sales growth, then the owners will net an extra profit of about $2, much less than the scenario of no expansion.  To make the same extra profit as in the first scenario, the owners need to generate an extra $11 in profit.  Minus the $4 in costs, the extra profit will be $7, the same as the first scenario.  Note that the owners are now trying to break even with the extra profits of not expanding.  To do that they must have sales of about $1037, or almost 2% real sales growth in addition to the 2% inflation growth.

Now, let’s consider a higher inflation rate of 4%.  Let’s imagine that the cost to borrow money is 8%, or 4% higher than inflation, as before, so that the cost of borrowing the $50 for a year is $4. As before, we’ll assume that the savings rate, or opportunity cost, of the $50 from the owner’ pockets is the same as inflation, or 4%, so that the imputed cost of the owners’ investment is $2.  Borrowed and imputed cost of the extra $100 invested in the company is now $6. If there is no real sales growth, total sales will now be $1040, or $40 more.  A 30% margin gives a gross profit of $12, leaving the owners with about $6 extra profit on investment.

Note that a doubling of the inflation rate in this scenario has produced a tripling of extra profit even with no real sales growth. Still the extra profits are less than not expanding at all.  They must still have a real increase in sales, but it is very small.

So a stable higher inflation rate and interest rate encourages business investment.  The key word here is stable.  We could keep doing this calculation with higher and higher rates producing more net profits to the owners but….  As inflation gets higher, it becomes less stable, less predictable and this unpredictability actually hurts business investment.

The Federal Reserve has set a target inflation rate of 2%.  I think it is too low and the lackluster growth of the economy seems to bear that out. Since the 1970s, prominent economists (Taylor and Tobin, for example) have suggested alternative targets that the Federal Reserve could use to replace the “dual mandate” set by the Congress in 1977.

A prominent alternative is a growth target in nominal GDP, called NGDP,  There are several variations but the one most favored has been level targeting, the calculation of GDP targets over the following five years or so based on an agreed growth rate.  The Fed would then take action to offset deviations from those targets. Two prominent economists, Robert Hall and Greg Mankiw, wrote a paper in 1993 explaining these alternative targets and the policy tools that the Federal Reserve could employ to help reach those targets.  During the period called the “Great Moderation,” from 1985-2007 national income grew at a rate just a bit more than 5%.

Hall and Mankiw noted (pg. 5) that the consensus among macroeconomists at that time was in favor of a targeting of nominal national income because it was a transparent measure, a clear, simple target.  The authors commented (pg. 4): “A rule like ‘Keep employment stable in the short run but prevent inflation in the long run’ [the current rule, by the way] has proven to be hopelessly vague; a central bank can rationalize almost any policy position with that rule.”

So the idea of nominal income or production targeting is familiar to economists and policymakers for several decades but has never been adopted. We can only assume, as the Nobel winner James Buchanan posited, that there is a very good reason for that.  When an obscure policy remains in place, it does so for a reason.  Enough policymakers want the obscurity that the policy provides.  I’m reminded of a letter John Adams wrote to Jefferson lamenting some of the vague language used in the Constitution which both of them had helped to craft.  Adams noted that the vagueness was necessary to reach consensus at the Constitutional Convention.  Efforts to achieve more precision in language or attempts to add specific detail were sometimes met with hardened disagreement.  The “general Welfare” wording of the tax and spending clause, Section 8, was one example.  Some argued that the lack of precision would give future generations of lawmakers some flexibility in determining what, in fact, was the general welfare of the United States.

 Whatever the Fed is doing now is only partially working and a different approach might be in order.  The use of the Labor Market Conditions Index, a broad composite of over twenty employment indicators, in guiding monetary policy shows that the Fed is reaching for a broader set of guidelines.  As Hall and Mankiw indicated, nominal targeting might give the Fed that broad guide, one that is less influenced by the needs and whims of elected politiciams.

Investment decline and the stock market

Let me finish on a somber note.  The year over year growth rate in the SP500 and private investment have both gone negative this year, for the first time since the end of the recession in 2009. The SP500 data is copyrighted so here’s a link to that chart. Pay attention.

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Notes:
If you would like to read more on the relationship of investment to savings, check out this 2006 NBER paper.

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Happy Labor Day and put a shrimp on the barbie as a toast to the summer passing!

Retail Sales and Inflation

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December 15th, 2013

Retail sales rose .7% in November, posting year over year (y-o-y) gains of almost 5%.  The twenty year average of y-o-y gains is 4.6%.  When we remove the eleven monthly outliers with gains of more than 10% or less than -10%, the average is 5.0%

Now let’s compare the percentage change in GDP with the change in retail sales.

The change in GDP is like a smoothed average of the change in retail sales, so the continuing willingness of consumers to spend is a positive for both GDP growth and the market in the mid-term outlook.

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In March 2009, incoming President Obama pledged that his administration was going to support small businesses which employ 1/2 the workforce and contribute 40% to GDP. (CBS News article  Note: The article incorrectly states that small businesses employ 70% of the workforce.) A recent report, short and written in plain English, by the Cleveland Federal Reserve compares levels of lending to small businesses in 2013 vs 2007.  Five years after the financial crisis, six years after the start of the recession, loans to small businesses are only 80% of 2007 levels.  Impacting the start up of small companies has been the decline in home values.  Home equity provides the funding for most small business start ups.

A graph from the report illustrates the long term decline of small business lending.  As the banking sector has consolidated over the past twenty years, the mega-banks have less incentive to “take a chance” on small businesses.

As I watch Senate and House hearings on C-Span (yes, I know I have a problem), I am struck by how many members of Congress appear to be on a mission.  While at times Washington seems to be a town of political prostitutes, it may be more accurate to describe it as a town of missionaries.  These dedicated men and women come to Washington with a plan to save the souls of the American people – or at least that’s the way they like to present themselves.  Nancy Pelosi and other prominent Democrats give voice to the plight of the long term unemployed but rarely mention small business owners.  A 50 year old guy who can’t find a job because his skills are out of date is a topic of concern to Democrats.  But what about the 50 year old who can’t start up a business because the drop in housing prices has diminished the equity of many home owners?  Republicans mention small businesses only when bashing Obamacare.  Why has there been so little attention paid to this rather large part of the economy?  Why aren’t the banks being subpoenaed to appear before a Congressional subcommittee?  Many Presidents seem to spend their second terms answering for the broken promises of their first term.  Finally, after eight years, voters turn to a new guy, hoping that this one will be different.  Hope, or foolishness, triumphs in the hearts of voters.

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Now I’ll take a look at a contentious subject, the measurement of inflation.  A comprehensive review of the inflation measurement is far beyond my skills and a blog.  The CPI produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics is the official measurement of inflation to adjust Social Security payments each year.  I want to come at the subject from a different viewpoint – corporate profits. Starting in 1990, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) adopted a new way of measuring inflation, introducing what is called a hedonic adjustment. Coincidentally, corporate profits began to surge shortly thereafter.  Below is a graph showing inflation adjusted profits.

Adjusting for population growth, the surge in per capita profits confirms the trend.

As I noted in September, corporate profits as a percent of GDP are at historically high levels.

In a FAQ sheet, the BLS explains their methodology in plain language and refutes the claim that hedonic adjustments have any significant impact on the CPI measurement. I have also discussed another measure of inflation, the PCE deflator.  Here is a working paper by an economist at the Federal Reserve on the PCE measurement.

For years, John Williams of Shadow Government Statistics (SGS) has painstakingly maintained an alternate data set of the CPI.  Here’s a graph from that page to give you an idea.

As you can see, the official measure of inflation is about 2 – 3% below the CPI that Williams produces using the pre-1990 methodology.  Essentially, hedonic adjustments measure inflation after consumers have adjusted to inflationary price pressures.  Let’s say that a family eats steak twice a week.  Steak then goes up in price by 20%.  To stay within their budget, a family might substitute hamburger for one of those meals.  The old method of measuring inflation would capture the 20% rise in the price of steak.  The post-1990 method does not capture all of that rise because it allows for the substitution effect.

Several reasons have been given for the dramatic rise in corporate profits since 1990.  These include globalization, technology, and increased productivity of both labor and capital.  As I wrote about in August, multi-factorial productivity has only increased 12% in the 12 years from 2000 – 2012, an annual gain of less than 1%.  Technological progress occurred in almost every decade of the past century, yet average economic growth is about 3% over those one hundred years – a remarkable consistency.  Globalization has helped and hurt domestic companies, enabling them to reduce costs but also increasing the competition from firms around the world.  Have companies found some magic key in the past twenty years?

The magic key may be the change in the CPI methodology. What if the CPI understates inflationary pressures by 2 – 3% each year?  What effects would that have?  Interest rates would be reduced, lowering the costs of borrowing for companies.  There would be less pressure from labor for wage increases.  These two factors figure heavily in the profits of many large companies. (Interest expense for GE is more than a third of their operating income ).  There is yet another effect: real profits adjusted for this higher inflation rate, would simply not be so dramatic.

Since 1990, per capita corporate profits have risen about 7.6% per year.

Now let’s adjust per capita profits for inflation using the official CPI and a higher inflation rate that is closer to the inflation measures that SGS compiles.

What we see is approximately 3% real growth in per capita profits since 1990.  This is quadruple the .75% growth rate of corporate profits for the thirty year period from 1959 – 1989.

The 30 year average was hurt by the 4% decline in inflation and population adjusted profits during the 1980s.  This decline undermines the conventional narrative that the 1980s were a big growth boom for companies.  The 50 year average of this real profit growth is 2.5%.  As a rule of thumb then, we can guesstimate inflationary pressures on consumers as the nominal rate of profit growth less 2.5%.  Let’s look at a chart I showed earlier.

The 7.6% nominal growth rate of profits less 2.5% gives us an average inflation rate of close to 5% for the past 23 years.  This different methodology lends more credence to the higher CPI calculations that SGS presents. Compare this to the 2.5% average that the BLS calculates for this time period.

Small changes in methodology add up over time.  While this “back of the envelope” method of computing inflation does not meet the rigor that Williams brings to his calculations, it does illustrate the difference in inflationary pressures that many families feel.  Here’s a comparison of the two indexes.

Now comes the juicy part and I will keep my voice low.  There is a conspiracy theory floating around that, in the late 1980s, the politicians in Washington were pressured by businesses to have the BLS revise their methodology to reduce rising labor costs which were hurting profits. Another theory says that Congress wanted to curb the annual CPI increases in Social Security and Medicare payments and secretly ordered the BLS to come up with a way to revise the CPI down.  In 50 years, financial historians may discover that both of these theories have some substance.

Whatever the “real” reason for the change in methodology, those who are dependent on retirement income indexed to the CPI should keep in mind that unmeasured inflationary pressures may eat an additional  2 – 3% out of their retirement savings base and income.

Credit Patterns

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July 28, 2013

Economic growth is hampered when credit growth declines.  In 2008, we experienced a sharp decline in confidence and lending that has only now reached the levels before the decline.

When we look at the big picture, we can see that we are now at more sustainable growth trends.

The amount of outstanding commercial and industrial loans is almost at the level last seen in 2008.

A smiliar slow recovery in business loans occurred during the 2001 recession.

Although housing evaluations have been rising, the amount of revolving equity lines of credit (HELOC) continues to decline.  The total outstanding is still high but approaching a more reasonable trendline of growth.

Recently rising bond yields have contributed to banks’  operating profit margins but the corresponding value of banks’ bond portfolios has fallen quite dramatically.

This decline in asset value affects bank capital ratios, which makes them less likely to increase their lending. which will be an impediment to economic growth.

This Wednesday the first estimate of 2nd quarter GDP will be released.  Real GDP growth is expected to be about 1.1%, less than the meager 1.8% growth of the 1st quarter.  Slowing growth may revive interest in bonds.  The recent sell off in bonds has probably been an over reaction incited by fears that the Federal Reserve will reduce its bond buying program dubbed “Quantitative Easing.”  While there are positive signs in the economy, they do not indicate any impending robust growth.

In addition to Wednesday’s release of GDP figures, the payroll firm ADP will show their monthly report of private employment growth, guesstimated to be slightly below the 188,000 gain predicted for June.  The BLS monthly labor report follows on Friday and will be watched closely.  Unemployment has been stuck in the mid-7% range since March and reductions in unemployment have been largely due to people either leaving the work force or taking part time jobs because they could not find full time work.

The Federal Reserve has said that its target for withdrawing its quantitative easing program is an unemployment target of 6.5%, with a caveat that inflation remains tame. A slow economy will naturally reduce inflationary pressures and improvements in the labor market are slowing as well.  In short, the Fed is likely to continue its monetary support for another year at least.

For a month now, the stock market has risen steadily in small increments, making up the losses that began in the third week of May.  Volume typically declines during summer months but this year’s volume of trading in SPY, the ETF that tracks the SP500 index, is 20% lower than this same time last year.  This week, we may see a market hesitation before the release of both the GDP and labor reports.