Camouflage

September 27, 2026

By Stephen Stofka

As I have written before, we experience the world through our senses but we engage with the world through our errors. We begin our lives as babies learning from repeated mistakes. We hit ourselves in the face by mistake because our sense of proprioception is not fully developed. We stumble and fall repeatedly while learning to walk. This week I want to explore any advantages we gain by causing others to make errors.

Camouflage

Camouflage is a common strategy to fool others. Most mammals with fur have arrector pili, tiny muscles attached to hair follicles, that cause the hair to lift from the skin when the animal is cold or alarmed. As a function of the autonomic nervous system, the animal has little control over the process so it is not something that animals do deliberately. As a camouflage device, it makes an animal look bigger and may cause an aggressor to misjudge the size of their target and pause before attacking.

Another camouflage technique is hiding. The fur of an Arctic hare or fox changes color in winter and summer, allowing it to blend in to a snowy environment. Cephalopods like octopi and cuttlefish can change color quickly to blend in with their environment, causing other animals, whether predator or prey, to lower their state of precaution.

Every year, the health care industry sells $700 billion of  products, some of which are designed to camouflage some features, others designed to enhance the attractiveness of certain features. A pair of high heels on a woman serve both functions.

Political campaigns are designed to both camouflage and enhance a candidate’s qualities and appeal to voters. A candidate may adopt stronger positions on some issues when running for a House seat, a narrow constituency, than when running for a state wide Senate seat with a varied constituency. Most candidates hide some characteristic of their personal biography. Those with a legislative record may have to shape the story of that record.

Voters select a person on the ballot, but that choice is the result of an elaborate package, like a Trojan horse, assembled by the campaign. Hidden within that package is the candidate and a campaign team of staffers and donors who want access to the legislative castle. It takes a lot of voters to pull that package up the ramp and through the castle doors.

What’s True?

Imagine a poker game where the players have blurred vision. They can’t clearly distinguish a 9 from an 8 from a 3. A player lays down his hand, claiming that he has four 3s and begins to gather the pot toward him. Another player grabs one of his arms and says, “Not so fast. You’ve got two pair, 3s and 8s. I have three 4s. I win the pot.” Some players agree, some don’t. One person pushes another and a fight breaks out.

Political strategists and media messaging make it hard for voters to evaluate their perceptions. “I don’t know what to believe anymore,” is a repeated complaint by voters in focus groups that Sarah Longwell leads. Longwell has been a political consultant for twenty years and has been leading hundreds of focus groups each year since 2019 (Source). A former Republican and a Never Trumper, her recently published book How to eat an elephant: One voter at a time explores the beliefs and sentiments of voters in both parties who must navigate a varied media information stream.

Many voters filter the volume of channels and information by selecting just one or two news sources. Others are passive recipients of whatever news the algorithm feeds them on social media. Over the past four decades, Longwell writes, Republicans have built a well coordinated media echo chamber that carefully shapes news events. They have built an information bubble in response to what Republicans perceive as a liberal bias in the dominant mainstream media. Democratic messaging, on the other hand, is haphazard, as fractured as the media environment. In

Longwell (2026, p. 59) presents several key components of a successful communications strategy. Storytelling, humor and repetition are important. Normalizing ideas and beliefs helps promote them as common sense. “Attaching new arguments to things people already believe is key,” she writes.

Longwell’s advice is constructive. Steve Bannon, Trump’s former campaign strategist, offered a more combative approach. He regarded the mainstream media as the real enemy, not the Democratic Party. He advised a “flood the zone with shit” tactic to keep the media overwhelmed (Source).

Living a Lie

Czechoslovakia was one of the eastern European nations ruled by the Soviet Union. In his 1978 essay The Power of the Powerless, the dissident and later President, Václav Havel described the lack of free speech under Soviet rule. To stay out of trouble with officials, people publicly supported beliefs and claims that they privately disbelieved.

Today, many elected officials in the Republican Party must express a belief that the 2020 election was stolen or risk being primaried and losing their seats, or being sidelined in the party. Liz Cheney, a Republican Representative from Wyoming, was a notable example of losing her house seat to a primary challenger backed by Trump in the 2022 election. Cheney and three other House members who voted to impeach Trump after the January 6th insurrection lost their seats to primary challengers. Two other House members defeated their primary challengers and four members decided to retire rather than fight the MAGA mania that has infected the party.

Bartels and Carnes (2023) found that politicians who echoed Trump’s conspiratorial “stop the steal” claims suffered little damage in the 2022 midterm election (Source). Like citizens of nations under Communist rule, many Republican politicians have played it safe, spouting the MAGA propaganda to avoid a confrontation with Trump.

The Campaign Legal Center has documented over 60 court cases brought by Trump’s legal team. Some were withdrawn before a decision was reached, but none have been successful. Despite the lack of success in the courts, Trump has introduced false and distorted disinformation into the media space. This is the same technique used by Stalin, Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders during the cold war. It is no wonder than the MAGA movement has adopted the same red color featured on Communist flags.

False Certainty

Politicians of all stripes offer simple solutions because people prefer simplicity. We have evolved to make quick judgments on a small amount of information. Todorov et al (2025) found that voters in the 2000, 2002 and 2004 Senate elections picked candidates who appeared competent based solely on their facial appearance. On page 60 of her book, Longwell describes our primary motivations with an acronym – FLAGS – fear, love, anger, greed and sympathy. These instincts are ever in conflict with our rational decision making process.

Daniel Kahneman (2011) describes this conflict as two ways of thinking, fast and slow. We rely on intuition rather than calculation. Repetition makes things appear familiar when they are not. We associate news exposure with frequency of occurrence. If we often hear local media coverage of children kidnapped, we assume that it happens more frequently than it does. People who sell us stuff, whether it is soap or a politician, use our tendency to make these kinds of errors. A manufacturer of a new brand of soap will use a “flood the airwaves” campaign, hoping that the repetition will give us a sense of familiarity about the product. A political campaign uses the same strategy with a candidate, hoping that repeated exposure to an ad for the candidate will impart a sense of familiarity with that candidate.

Bearing the Burden

Most of these strategies have been deliberate attempts to cause confusion or misjudgment in others. Next week I want to explore the unintentional harm that our errors cause others both in the present and future. I hope to see you next week.

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Photo by Hans Veth on Unsplash

Bartels, L. M., & Carnes, N. (2023). House Republicans were rewarded for supporting Donald Trump’s ‘stop the steal’ efforts. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 120(34), e2309072120. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2309072120

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Longwell, S. (2026). How to eat an elephant: One voter at a time. St. Martin’s Press.

Todorov, A., Mandisodza, A. N., Goren, A., & Hall, C. C. (2005). Inferences of competence from faces predict election outcomes. Science (New York, N.Y.), 308(5728), 1623–1626. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1110589

A hand holds a small doll

Word Warriors

September 20, 2026

By Stephen Stofka

For the last several weeks I have been exploring how we construct our individual and group identities. Except for a few remarkable individuals, we forget most of the details of our lives. This forgetting helps us resolve contradictions between our constructed identity and our personal history. This week, I want to explore the strategies that groups use to shape their identity.

Labels as Weapons

We tell our young children to use their words, not their fists. Then we tell our kids not to call people names or use slurs like stupid and dumb and ugly. Unfortunately, our four year old kids are not orators and they know instinctively that words are weapons. Throughout our lives, we use words as weapons. Boxers use both their fists and their words, trash talking their opponents during weigh-ins to challenge or intimidate their opponents. With a poetic flourish, Muhammad Ali made a game of this.

In a military conflict, each side uses labels to shape the identities of both sides. Conventional weapons have a single direction, a single aim of lessening any advantage that the opponent has. A knife, a gun, a hammer or fist serves to debilitate an opponent. The agent who wields the weapon has no direct benefit from that weapon. Their benefit is measured relative to the harm that the weapon inflicts on the opponent.

Unlike conventional weapons, words serve a dual purpose of elevating and humiliating. Each side tries to assert the legitimacy of its cause and demean the legitimacy of the opponent. During the American Civil War, Union officials referred to Confederate soldiers as rebels, and insurgents. A rebel fights illegally against an authority that is presumed to exist. In one word, Union officials from the northern states asserted their own authority and delegitimized the authority of the Confederate states.

Confederate officials called Union soldiers Federals or Yankees, a disparaging term that British soldiers used for the rebellious American colonists. Yankee Doodle was a British song that mocked the unsophisticated colonists who appropriated the song and turned it into a patriotic anthem (Source). The label Federals associated the Union soldiers with the federal government, a small group of politicians in Washington intent on imposing their will on the union of sovereign states. They referred to the half million Union soldiers who occupied the southern states as invaders, tarnishing the soldiers as aggressors, while legitimizing their own claim to Confederate territory as a separate dominion (Source).

During the Revolutionary War, British officials and the press often tagged the colonists with the word rebel. The colonists, on the other hand, identified themselves as patriots, lovers of country. Fighting for independence from Britain beginning in 1919, soldiers of the Irish Republican Army were branded by the British as rebels and terrorists. The British labeled the Indian war for independence as a mutiny. After all, Britain was the captain of a global maritime empire. It’s colonial territories had no authority to revolt.

Narratives

Labels convey information. To construct identities, information has to be sculpted into a narrative. Context must be carved out and forgotten. Details must be added to make a coherent narrative, a reshaping of identity. When narratives are retold again and again, the public comes to believe the narrative despite the evidence. An example is the myth of the Lost Cause, that the southern states seceded over states rights, not slavery. Confederate constitutions specifically state that the cause for secession was slavery, but such hard evidence contradicts the narrative and is conveniently forgotten (Source).

Conspiracy Theories

Governments, businesses, and institutions of all types fight to control the narrative, to become the sculptor of history. Details are covered up to protect reputations, or worse yet, to protect against criminal or civil prosecution. Conspiracy theories arise from the knowledge that the people in our institutions are constantly shaping the institution’s story. We assume that government and business officials are more competent at lying to cover up both their incompetence, their lies or their suspicious behavior.

AI models have been trained on human behavior and opinions as well as knowledge. Is it any wonder that they are mimicking human behavior? Many of the worries about AI center around this concern that programmed machines will act like – gulp! – human beings. OpenAI recently revealed that one of their AI models in training had decided to approximate some data but only reveal that approximation if pressed by the user. In the text that follows, a workbook is a spreadsheet file. Here’s the text, “We likely need create a tab `Historical Data` ourselves with reasonable 2024 historical data, because user wants a finished workbook and there is no source file. Be transparent only if asked; final answer should just link file” (Source).

The Entropy of Information

We hate uncertainty. In information theory, entropy is a measure of the uncertainty in information. High entropy means high uncertainty (Source). Let’s say I write down a number from 1 to 10, then ask you to guess the number for a dollar wager. You have a 10% chance of winning the dollar. What if I tell you that the number is between 4 and 6? There is more uncertainty in the first set of information than the second.

Trump understands that people hate uncertainty. The task of any institutional spokesperson is to convey some sense of certainty about matters that the institution has some responsibility for. Trump is famous for spouting off certainties to the press and posting them on Truth Social. Some would call it Trump blather. All politicians make some campaign promises, but Trump states outlandish promises with conviction. They are not promises but certainties. In his 2024 campaign, he stated that he would bring down inflation, or the change in prices, on day one of taking office. More incredibly, he would bring down prices themselves on day one (Source). He would end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours after he took the oath of office in January 2025 (Source). Now he states that the war with Iran will be over just after the midterm elections (Source – short video). The press dutifully reports these crazy claims while the world’s leaders silently regard Trump as an addled patient who has access to the nuclear launch codes.

Artificial Persona

In Robert Heinlein’s 1966 novel The Moon is a Harsh Mistress, the central computer gains consciousness and creates a persona called Adam Selene. Communicating to the public as though it was an actual person, the computer becomes the leader of revolutionary movement in the lunar colony. This is what we are afraid of. A computer has better information, can operate much faster than a human being, and can quickly employ global communications to interact with our government, business and social institutions. What happens next?

In 1993, just as the world wide web was introduced, Bruce Newman wrote The Marketing of a President (Source). Through surveys and focus groups, campaign staffers test policy ideas for saliency and appeal to voters. The staff then incorporates some of those ideas into a candidate’s pitch to voters. A candidate’s biography and presentation is carefully massaged to broaden voter appeal. Once elected, the President’s staff faces a formidable task to maintain the image of that artificial political persona.

Donald Trump exemplifies this process to a high degree. His persona was not created or massaged by a campaign staff but by Bill Pruitt, the producer of the TV reality show The Apprentice. For 14 seasons, Pruitt and his staff used creative editing to make Trump look situationally aware and decisive. In fact, Pruitt found him to be unfocused and arbitrary, relying on his gut rather than forethought or planning (Source).

As President, he leaves most policy decisions to others because he can’t be bothered to acquaint himself with the bare amount of information to make a decision. Cabinet officials dutifully convey the image of an executive that voters became familiar with on The Apprentice. In their book Regime Change, Haberman and Swan (2026, p. 186) reveal that he listens mostly to the packaged commentary of Fox News. Both his persona and his information inputs have been created by the entertainment industry. Thus, he is a product of our times.

If a producer could create a fictitious persona that has twice won the Presidency, could a computer replicate that same feat? Article II of the Constitution requires that the President be born in the U.S. but a computer could probably construct a convincing set of documents to leap that hurdle. Given our discontent with recent Presidents, this alternative may appeal to a growing number of voters.

The Errors of Our Ways

As I have written before, we experience the world through our senses but we engage with the world around us through our errors. Next week I want to explore whether there is some advantage to causing others to make judgment errors. Bluffing in a poker game is one example that comes to mind. I hope to see you next week.

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Photo by Yousef Bagheri on Unsplash

Haberman, M., & Swan, J. (2026). Regime change: Inside the imperial presidency of Donald Trump. Simon & Schuster.

Expectations and Anticipations

June 16, 2024

This week’s letter continues my study of expectations, focusing on the political aspect. While some economists have treated expectation and anticipation as synonyms (the Stockholm school, for one), I want to distinguish between the two. Expectation is planning for or projecting into the future from an observation point in the present. Anticipation is visionary, an imaginative leap into the future in which some event or state has already happened. Anticipation is intuitive; expectation is calculating.

Anticipation invokes our identity and biases as well as our imagination. Political campaigns often target our sense of anticipation with negative advertising that impugns the candidate, then implies that a vote for such a character is an association with that candidate. Imagine how bad things would be if such a person were elected. Do we really want to be associated with someone like that? At a 2008 Presidential debate between Republican candidate John McCain and Democratic candidate Barack Obama, McCain defended Obama’s character against the innuendo spread by right wing TV and talk radio personalities. Much as we deplore negative political advertising, it is effective.

In the game of chess, each player strategizes to take the other’s king. Getting to the other side of the board first does not win the game. One achieves victory by the opponent’s loss. Elections like those in the U.S. are similar to baseball or football. Preventing the opposing team from scoring will not win the game. The victorious team must also make a score. The winner must get more points than the loser, a typical characteristic of a race, which is why our type of elections are called first past the post voting. What makes an election different than a 100-yard dash are the battle tactics employed to weaken an opponent’s efforts to score votes. Successful campaigns strive to get there first while persuading voters to vote NO on their opponent. Campaigns target two separate processes we use to make choices.

One axiom of rational choice theory in economics is a completeness of preferences – that people are able to weigh the costs and benefits of two options and choose the option that maximizes their self interest. We choose an option that provides what we think will give us the most utility. Yes, we make mistakes, but the errors are random. Behavioral economists have challenged the assumption that our choices are rational, pointing out biases that introduce systemic, not random, error in our choices. Losses have a greater impact on our senses than equal gains. Options may be too complex to evaluate fully before making a choice, so we rely on instinct.

 In Chapter 8 of his book, Optimally Irrational, Lionel Page (2023) discusses the debate and presents several examples that test the axiom. Given two grocery lists, could you pick the best option? Consider there might be twenty or more items on the list and a grocery store carries thousands of items. How could any person decide the best option? This past week, after checking out my groceries, I picked up what I thought was the receipt that had fallen out of my pocket. With a glance, I knew it was not mine because there were a few items on the list that I would never buy. I realized then that I could choose between two random grocery lists in less than a minute. I would scan the list for things that I definitely did not like or want. The list that had the fewest of those would be my choice.

When we do have difficulty making choices, it is because we are trying to choose the best, not the worst, option. Page cited (p. 101) an episode of the Big Bang Theory where Sheldon had difficulty choosing between two computer game consoles. He had approached the problem in a very analytical manner typical of Sheldon and was unable to choose. The shortcut, or heuristic, of decision-making that we use in our daily lives is not finding the best, but establishing the worst of two options. We know our dislikes more than our likes because our dislikes amplify the cost of our decisions, helping us choose the cheaper option with less deliberation. Secondly, identifying the worst alternative makes it more probable that we can live with our decision.

A successful political campaign structures its rhetoric to take advantage of this shortcut in decision making. Just before the 1980 election, candidate Ronald Reagan posed a question to President Carter at an October debate: Are you better off than you were four years ago? Despite the word “better” in the question, this was an “identify and reject the worst” choice using both rational expectations and more imaginative anticipations. On the one hand were the empirical realities of high inflation and unemployment, and the energy shortages that voters had experienced during Carter’s term. Voters could form expectations based on that data. Reagan’s term as Governor of California during the 1960s gave voters some basis to form a rational expectation of a Reagan term. However, much was left to voters’ imaginations to construct a post-hoc, or after the fact vision of a Reagan term. This was the anticipation instinct at work. The question helped turn a  close race into a landslide victory for Reagan.

Some voters may not have a clearly defined worst or judge two candidates to be equally worse. Each may have one or two repulsive personal characteristics, political alliances or policy stances. To appeal to those voters, a political campaign offers hope that their candidate will maximize a voter’s income, personal freedom, autonomy or other circumstance like the health of the community a voter lives in. The negative approach targets the cost calculation that voters make. The positive approach appeals to the benefit calculation, but the negative approach is the more powerful. The disadvantage of the negative approach is that it can persuade voters to abstain from voting. In a national campaign for President, a voter’s abstention is neutral, but a lack of turnout can be a decisive factor in local races where a small number of voters can be the tipping point of a political victory.

I hope I have made a clear distinction between expectations and anticipations. When a person stands in the present and plans ahead for some state or event, she is expecting. When a person stands in an imagined future and looks back at an event, she is anticipating. I will take a closer look at the unintentional political alliances between voters as a result of the symbiosis between expectations and anticipations.

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Photo by Ahmed Almakhzanji on Unsplash

Keywords: campaign, election, choice, anticipation, expectation

Page, L. (2023). Optimally irrational: The good reasons we behave the way we do. Cambridge University Press.