Sorry, no pictures or graphs this week 😉
A few weeks ago, the Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the health care act. 26 states brought suit against the government, asserting that the Government had no constitutional authority to impose a penalty on people for not buying health insurance. Regardless of the arguments for and against, many of us have a gut level aversion to the Federal Government, or a State Government, for that matter, forcing us to do something. While living in Brooklyn in the early 70s, I knew two people who had left good jobs to take sporadic cash only jobs because they did not want to be forced to have their taxes pay for the Vietnam War, a war they – and many others – believed was immoral. In my state, Colorado, there have been many who think that the state government has no right to force drivers to wear seat belts. For those of you in the more crowded coastal states with better public transportation systems, driving in the western states is as much a necessity of living as eating.
The Government argued that Congress had the power to impose an individual mandate to buy health insurance under the following authorities: 1) the power to regulate Commerce as found in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution; 2) the Necessary and Proper Clause (clause 18 of the same section); and 3) the taxing power in the Constitution.
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the first argument, writing “Congress has never attempted to rely on that power [the constitutional power to regulate Commerce] to compel individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product.” (pg. 18 majority opinion) He asserts that the Constitutional grant of power to the Congress to regulate Commerce does not imply that the Congress can create Commerce. On page 20, he writes “The individual mandate … does not regulate existing commercial activity.” On pg. 24, Roberts writes “The Framers [of the Constitution] gave Congress the power to regulate commerce, not to compel it, and for over 200 years both our decisions and Congress’s actions have reflected this understanding.” In short, “regulate” does not mean “create” nor does it mean “compel.”
During oral arguments, Justices Roberts and Kennedy had repeatedly asked the government advocate for a limiting principle to Congress’ authority to regulate Commerce. On page 21, Roberts makes an important distinction in the Wickard v Filburn case regarding a 1942 law that had the effect of regulating a farmer, Roscoe Filburn, growing wheat for his own consumption. The Wickard decision, Roberts summarized, upheld Congress’ authority to regulate the production of something, not the consumption of a product. The individual mandate regulates the consumption of a product. “Accepting the Government’s theory would give Congress the same license to regulate what we do not do, fundamentally changing the relation between the citizen and the Federal Government.” (pg. 23)
On page 25, Roberts rejects the Government’s oft repeated argument that individuals are inherently “active in the market for health care,” writing that any inactivity can be said to be participating in some arbitrary market; without any limiting distinction, the phrase has no constitutional significance. He writes “Our precedents recognize Congress’s power to regulate ‘class[es] of activities’…not classes of individuals, apart from any activity in which they are engaged.” He finds that the individual mandate breaks precedent: “The individual mandate’s regulation of the uninsured as a class is, in fact, particularly divorced from any link to existing commercial activity.” Who can regulate individuals? The states alone have that power: “Any police power to regulate individuals as such, as opposed to their activities, remains vested in the States.”
Roberts rejected the government’s second argument that Congress has the authority to impose the individual mandate under the Necessary and Proper Clause as a regulatory mechanism associated with the existing economic activity of healthcare. The Government argued that the mandate is an “integral part of a comprehensive scheme of economic regulation.” Roberts reasserts previous precedents that the intention of this clause of the Constitution is to unequivocally grant Congress power which is incidental or instrumental in enacting the powers enumerated in the previous clauses of that section of the Constitution. It does not give Congress new powers or enable Congress the ability to expand its power.
The Government’s third argument, a fallback position, was that the mandate was not “ordering individuals to buy insurance, but rather as imposing a tax on those who do not buy that product.” Roberts cites previous precedents that “if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the means that does not do so.” On page 31, Roberts writes that “The most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance.” However, he acknowledges the merits of the Government’s contention that the mandate “can be regarded as establishing a condition – not owning health insurance – that triggers a tax” and that the mandate “makes going without insurance just another thing the Government taxes, like buying gasoline or earning income.” (pg. 32) Roberts acknowledges that this interpretation of the mandate is not the most natural one, but cites previous precedent that “The question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of the mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’ one.”
For the purposes of the Constitution, is the individual mandate a tax or an “assessable penalty?” Roberts cites several previous laws in which Congress has shown that it regards a tax and a penalty as two separate entities. He quotes a previous decision, that of Drexel Furniture, which ruled that what distinguishes a penalty from a tax is whether an exaction or payment is punitive. If so, then it is a penalty. The tax imposed by the individual mandate is less than what it would cost someone to buy a policy, indicating that Congress had no intent to impose a punitive penalty. The individual mandate does not have a scienter requirement typically associated with a penalty; that an individual must have intent or knowledge that their action or inaction is against the law. In addition, there is no criminal prosecution if someone does not pay the tax, another indication of Congress’ intention that the mandate is a tax. In the law, there is no requirement to buy an insurance policy; there is only the imposition of a tax if you don’t buy a policy. Roberts also cites an older precedent regarding the child labor law tax. Even though the law called it a tax, the court held that, because it was very punitive, it was a penalty, regardless of what Congress called it. Roberts is continuing to build on previous court decisions to reinforce the court’s policy that, although the court should regard the use of a particular word by Congress as intentional, Congress can not obfuscate the stated intentions of the entirety of a law by attaching a label to a piece of it. On page 12 of the majority opinion, he writes “Congress cannot change whether an exaction is a tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes by describing it as one or the other.”
Did the Supreme Court even have the authority to hear this case at this time? Did the 1867 Anti-Injunction Act prevent the court from hearing the case till someone actually paid the tax? In finding that the individual mandate can be construed as a tax, Roberts distinguishes between a present tax and a future tax, justifying the Court’s authority to hear the case at this time. The Anti-Injunction Act was designed to prevent a state or any party from “restraining the assessment or collection of tax” (pg. 12 of majority opinion). The tax will not go into effect for two years and no one will actually pay the tax for three years. The suit that the 26 states have brought before the Supreme Court is not intended to delay the collection of this tax; therefore, Roberts rules that the Supreme Court can hear the case.
Although Justice Ginsburg was in the majority, she strongly dissented with Roberts arguments that the individual mandate was unconstitutional under the Commerce clause. Hopefully, I’ll get some time to go into Ginsburg’s arguments as well as the dissenting opinions of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito.